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CAN THE KENTUCKY CONSUEmR EvwR FORG=r CAVEAT
EmPToR AND FnD TRUE HAPPmSs?
The political personality of the modern marketplace can best be
characterized as mass-produced flags and assembly-line apple pie,
the enormity of the economic entities dominating each major industry
being matched only by the vigor with which their corporate executives
and trade associations extol the virtues of individual initiative. Thus,
although a bill which would give an agency of state government the
responsibility and legal weaponry to protect the consuming public
would appear at first glance to have a corner on virtue since its bene-
ficiary is middle class Americans, it is equally balanced by the appeal
of possible opposition to the Pavlovian political reactions engendered
by such terms as "free enterprise" and "big government."1 However,
a careful examination of the premises for and provisions of legislative
attempts to eradicate fraudulent trade practices will show that they
are truly designed to protect both business and consumer interests,
and that their effect on the free market system is one of restoration
rather than destruction. This note undertakes such an analysis by
considering the monetary and legal problems confronting today's
buyer with a view toward deriving the type of remedial state legisla-
tion required. Then, concluding that the statutory solutions attempted
by several states form a generally appropriate mold, the note uses the
proposal recently promulgated by the Kentucky Attorney Generars
Consumer Protection Council2 as a convenient touchstone for a com-
parative analysis of the components of the various laws.
FREE ENTERPRISE AM 'rm MODERN MARKXELACE
Classic maxims of economics and traditional axioms of civics both
assert that the most reliable method to achieve the most efficient alloca-
tion of the nation's wealth is a free market.3 The theory holds that:
Given a free flow of information, reasonably equal bargaining
positions, and a product with a generally elastic demand, the
I That even the appeal of a bill whose direct beneficiaries are "the people"
could be negated by the fact it might enlarge the government is illustrated by this
somewhat jocular, but nevertheless apt, description of the American electorate:
The attitude of a successful democracy's citizen toward their govern-
ment is a strange alloy of affection and suspicion, of confidence and of
fear. It is said proudly that government is of, by and for the people, but
it is added quickly that the less of it there is the better. Wirtz, Govern-
ment By Private Groups, 13 LA. L. Ruv. 440 (1953).
2 The Kentucky Business and Consumer Protection Act was drafted by the
Legislation Committee of the Kentucky Attorney General's Consumers' Council.
Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 20, 1969, § B, at 1, col. 4.
3 Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 Mrca L. BRv. 1203, 1222 (1966),
and sources cited therein.
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interchange works to provide an adequate supply to meet de-
mand at any given price level. As long as the bargaining process
is maintained, a competitive market is assured and no intervening
forces are necessary.
4
While this may have enduring applicability to the contemporary
scene as a theory, it certainly is not descriptive of the modem market-
place, and therein lies both the strength of the proposed Act and the
weakness of raising "free enterprise" in objection to it. It is to say the
obvious to refer to the immense disparity in the bargaining posi-
tions of corporation and consumer as an elementary illustration of the
difference between economic theory and reality. Further differences
are similarly obvious.5 Mass marketing and advertising have replaced
the formerly personal relations between retailer and buyer. Modem
packaging not only prevents the consumer from determining the
amount of his purchase, but also prevents price per quantity com-
parison 6 and inspection of the wares. And, even were inspection pos-
sible, "[t]oday's average consumer is in little position to know whether
claims made for an automobile, drug, house, synthetic fabric or pre-
packaged food are accurate."7 The increasing complexity of con-
sumer goods requires the purchaser "to be a combination of chemist,
tester, accountant, engineer, designer and merchandiser. .. " to prop-
erly evaluate them.8
These deficiencies are further compounded by the fact that the
consumer is dependent upon advertising to obtain the information
necessary to enable him to sift through this technological maze and
make the intelligent choice that classical theorists presuppose. Yet,
advertising is precisely the medium by which industry frustrates such
a choice and focuses attention on differentiations on the basis of trade
names and meaningless puffery rather than quality and price com-
petition. Since such misleading representations of value are not ac-
tionable while misrepresentations of fact are, it is natural that adver-
tisers take the safest option by eliminating facts from their commercial
inducements and present only "uninformative superlatives."9 But, such
4 Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, 54 IowA
L. Rxv. 319, 320 (1968), citing A. BEmuE, THE AnmmucAN EcoNomic REPUBLIC
81-85, 91-96 (1963), and J. GABRnA=rr, AmmucAN CAvrrAirsm: THE CoNcEPT or
CouvNErvaw wa PowERs 10-24, 708-34 (rev. ed. 1956).
5 See Barber, supra note 3, at 1219-29.
6 Id. at 1208.
7 O'Connell, Consumer Protection in the State of Washington, 39 STATE
Gov-T 230, 231 (1966).
8 Id.; 54 IowA L. REv., supra note 4, at 324.
9 Travers, The New Kansas Buyer Protection Act, 38 KAN. B. AssN J. 11
(1969).
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valueless information is used for offensive as well as defensive pur-
poses.
The sale of soap and other cleaning products offers a good
illustration of the role which advertising plays in the market pro-
cess. For example, liquid household bleach is a 5.25 percent
sodium hydroclorite solution, regardless of the trade name it
bears. However, by a deluge of advertising, sellers have suc-
ceeded so well in differentiating one trade-named bleach from
another that sales of a particular product are largely governed by
the size of the seller's advertising expenditures. As a result of the
strong consumer identification of the best known brands of liquid
bleach, like Clorox and Purex, it has been possible to sell them
at prices above those of lesser-known brands possessing identical
chemical properties.1 0
In addition to allowing tradenames to be priced more expensively
than their unheralded equals, advertising also allows the seller to
totally abandon price competition and employ deceptive pricing by
either claiming reductions from a fictitious former price or using odd
quantities to frustrate price per quantity comparisons with com-
petitors or with various sizes of the same product.1 In such circum-
stances, "it is fiction to talk of the allocative efficiencies of the price
system."
2
Admittedly, most of this data is best employed as a rationale for
the type of informational legislation recently on the Congressional
docket.13 However, there are serious weaknesses in focusing on infor-
10 Barber, supra note 3, at 1223-24.
11 The problem of deceptive pricing has been well described as follows:
Prices, supposedly the common denominator in a free economy, are no
longer stated clearly. Packages marked 'five cents off regular price tell the
buyer very little, since there is no 'regular price.' Moreover, even when
a price is not stated ambiguously, it frequently cannot be compared
with prices for other brands of the same product since physical char-
acteristics of the products may be unknown and since advertising ac-
centuates the supposed differences among products rather than re-
vealing their physical similarities. Indeed, the stated prices for various
package sizes of the same product are often very difficult to compare.
For example, it would be hard for a typical shopper to select the best
price-per-ounce size from among the following packages of the same
brand of cookies: one pound for forty-nine cents, eleven ounces for
thirty-five cents, and 6.5 ounces for twenty-five cents. In many cases it
is cheaper to buy two smaller units of a given product than one 'giant
economy size.' When prices cannot be directly compared, it is fiction to
talk of the allocative efficiencies of a price system. Barber, supra note 3,
at 1226.
12Id.
13 See Pnus. CoMM. ON CONSUMR Issups 7 (1966); Hart, Can Federal
Legislation Affecting Consumers Economic Interests Be Enacted., MIcH. L. Rv.
1255 (1966); Travers, supra note 9, at 11. See generally Hearings on S. 985 and
H. R. 15440 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966) (fair packaging and labelling). See also Kinter,
Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1269
(1966).
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mation as a panacea, most notably both its failure to provide for the
lower class consumer who is oblivious to the dissemination of such
information 14 and its inability to cope with the truly fraudulent peddler
who will persist in utilizing misinformation if there are inadequate
penalties and enforcement. 15
Moreover, the dependence of the consuming public on adver-
tising and the confusion in the marketplace which has resulted,
reveals more fallacies in the contemporary applicability of the lib-
eral model than informational problems. It reveals the consumer
as a debilitated commercial force hardly adequate to fulfill his role
in the free market 16 and exceptionally easy prey for the fraudulent
deceiver. This ineptitude is amply illustrated by a study in which
college-trained, married and experienced shoppers, when instructed
to select the best buys, failed 43 percent of the time resulting in
the overexpenditure of 10 percent of the total cost.' 7 It is not sur-
prising, then, that the annual losses of the consuming public to the
true commercial racketeers, exclusive of losses to the simple decep-
14 The plight of the poor consumer can be excerpted from an excellent stu-
dent note as follows:
The most significant new legislation proposals have been informa-
tional. The truth-in-lending bills. ... Truth-in-packaging proposals....
Generally, the law presup poses a consumer equipped to deal with
the business community on at least equal terms....
Informational legislation does not question the general accuracy of
this model, but assumes a very particular sort of destination: the ab-
sence of a specific sort of knowledge needed to make 'best buys.' Once
provided, that information will by itself return consumers to their rightful
place as all-powerful sovereigns of the retail market...
Whatever its validity for the middle-class, this model is almost always
inapplicable to the purchases of the poor....
[T]he typical low income consumer is not a hardened penny
pincher employing all his skill and inegenuity to stretch his meager in-
come as far as he can....
In sum, the new wave of informational legislation will be of little
help to the poor because it presupposes values, motivation and knowl-
edge which do not generally exist among them.... As one merchant in
New York put it: 'People do not shop in this area. . . It is just up
to who catches him.' (Emphasis original). Note Consumer Legislation
and the Poor, 76 YAx_ L. J. 745 747-49, 754 (1967), citing D. CAP-
ovrrz, Thx PooR PAY MoRE 19 (1963).
15 See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Con-
sumer Transaction Problems, 48 BOSTON U. L. REv. 559 (1968); see also Spanogle,
The U3C-It May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 Owo STATE L. J. 642
(1968).
16 X recent study cited by Senator Cotton revealed that the modem con-
sumer in many instances no longer even shops in such places as supermarkets,
choosing 32 of the 8,000 available items in 15-18 minutes. That rate allows ap-
proximately 1/9 second per available item. 112 CONG. REc. 12090, 12094 (1966).
17 112 CONG. RBE. 12766, 12805 (1966). Since approximately $500 billion
is spent annually on personal consumption expenditures, this inability to function
would cost the consuming public a sizeable sum each year. FTC ANNuAL REPOnT
5 (1968).
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tions in advertising and pricing already discussed, runs into the
billions. Home improvement frauds, a well known example of the
principal rackets, cost an estimated $1 billion annually.18 Losses from
counterfeit brandname goods were assessed at $2 billion annually
over a decade ago.19 These and the other billions lost each year to
similarly well known frauds constitute losses not only individually to
the consumers, but also collectively to the honest businessmen who
would have received this money in purchases had the deceptive
practices of their unfair competitors been illegalized and eliminated.
20
Thus, the disparity in the bargaining positions of business and
consumer which has rendered the buyer impotent and the market
imbalanced results in an enormous waste of resources to both busi-
ness and consumer. To promulgate an approach calculated to buttress
the role of the consumer would, therefore, not only solve these symp-
tomatic weaknesses, but also tend to restore viability to the market
structure.
THm Rot. OF GOvERNmEN
To rectify the imbalance of power in the marketplace, the con-
sumer interest must be represented by an entity comparable to the
monoliths which foster and protect the views of the producer. Yet,
while business, labor and agriculture are organized to achieve their
purposes, it is impractical, if not impossible, for the consumer to be
similarly organized because the class, "by definition, include(s) us
all."2 1 The only organization the consumer can turn to is the one
which, in view of that definition, is distinctively his, the government.
22
18 Testimony of Attorney General of Wisconsin Bronson C. LaFollette,
Hearings on H. R. 7179 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 84-85 (1966); Pans. CoMM. ON CoN-
sumEr INTERE Ts, supra note 13, at 42.
19 Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective Pro-
grams for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 395-96 (1966) and sources cited
therein.
20 See Dixon, Federal State Cooperation to Combat Unfair Trade Practices,
39 STATE GovT. 37, 38 (1966); 54 IowA L. Rv., supra note 4, at 319.
21 108 CoNG. REc. 4167, 4263 (1962) (message of President John F. Ken-
nedy).22 This will, of course, incur the propaganda ploy of cries of 'big govern-
ment.' However, what merit there is to such an objection lies in the concept of
increased direction of one's private affairs. The consumer and his advocates are
to be reminded that the focus of legislation herein discussed will decrease the
direction of one's affairs by business. The power is equally noxious whether it
flows from corporate or governmental sources.
The distinction is . . . between the controls resulting from the delib-
erative decisionmaking of representatives vested by the people with
the power to write their decisions into binding law, and controls which
represent only the results of the interplay of competitive forces in the
maketplace. Wirtz, supra note 2, at 450.
(Continued on next page)
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Of course, the involvement of the government to protect the con-
sumer could hardly be innovative. "For at least seven hundred years
the hand of authority-church, guild or state-has played a role in
regulating the affairs of the market.... 23 The federal government is
currently employing a multi-faceted-which may be synonymous with
confused-approach to consumer problems, with hundreds of endeavors
being scattered "to the point where nearly every agency performs
some sort of consumer service either directly or indirectly."24 These
include the traditional activities of such departments as Agriculture,
Commerce2 5 and the Post Office 26 and of such regulatory bodies as
the Federal Communications Commission. 27 Also included are the
recent attempts to coordinate such activities through groups advising
the President,28 whose efficacy and efficiency have been properly
criticized because of the weakness inherent in "advisory" bodies.
29
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Furthermore, the organized producing groups never hesitate to utilize the
government to their advantage. Whether by eliciting action or inaction, they
n duce governmental support in achieving price bases, subsidies, monopoly markets,
Sfair price" laws, eliminating of wholesale competition with retail prices, etc.
See Barber supra note 3, at 1219-21.
23 Barber, supra note 3, at 1205.
2 4
P _s. COMML. ON CONSUNER INTERESTS, GuIDE TO FEDERAL CoNsuhuE
SERvicEs 1 (1967) (a 140 page list of federal activities).
25 Barber, supra note 3, at 1210-11.26 See PRFES. Comm., supra note 24, at 85-87; Note, The Regulation of Ad-
vertising, 56 COLJm. L. REv. 1018, 1043-45 (1956); 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra
note 19, at 440-42.
27 See Pms. Comm., supra note 24, at 33-37; 56 CoLum. L. REv, supra note
26, at 1045-48.
28 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 438-39.
29 The state of affairs at this level of the federal government has been
described by one critic as follows:
This conglomeration of councils, committees and special assistants that
supposedly represent consumers at the federal government's highest
policy-making levels resembles the disorganized and random assortment
of activities that are carried out by the thirty-five principle departments
and agencies. Groups and individuals have been hurriedly assembled
to meet a vaguely felt need, but there is no clear sense of purpose.
Although both a Committee on Consumer Interests and a Consumer
Advisory Council exist, it is difficult to determine the separate func-
tions which they serve. The Committee's responsibility is to 'consider'
federal 'policies and programs of primary importance to consumers,'
while the Council has been directed to 'advise the Government on issues
of broad economic policy of immediate concern to consumers.' Both
groups are served by the same staff, which in turn reports directly to
the Special Assistant, and the holder of that office is chairman of the
Committee and an ex officio member of the Advisory Council. If the
Committee implemented programs developed by the Council and ap-
proved by the President, its function would be understandable. How-
ever, the Committee's job is not to implement, but rather to advise,
and that is a responsibility also of the Advisory Council. The point at
which one ends and the other begins is a puzzle, like so much gov-
ernmental activity in the consumer area.
Perhaps the single most important weakness in the entire scheme is the
(Continued on next page)
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Yet, proposals for a Department or Office of Consumer Affairs have
been unavailing 30 and have even been opposed by consumer ad-
vocates. 31
In the foreground of the federal effort is the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC), which, since the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1936,
has jurisdiction over deceptive acts and practices in interstate com-
merce.32 While the FTC has made substantial progress in the pro-
tection of the consuming public, its limitations of jurisdiction, budget-
ary restrictions, inefficiency and lack of initiative not only leave
ample room for improvement, but also create a void in the protec-
tion of the consumer which must be flled by state governments.33
First, the range of problems the FTC can even attack is narrow
by operation of both law and circumstances. Its jurisdictional pur-
view is limited to acts in commerce, not the broader term of affecting
commerce which is employed in many other endeavors. 34 "This nar-
rower jurisdictional grant is satisfied only by the actual involvement
in interstate commerce" 35 of the allegedly deceptive practice, leaving
the partially interstate as well as the wholly intrastate practices to
state officials. Moreover, the requirement that all FTC actions be in
the public interest,36 coupled with the practical problems of budget
and staff necessitate a screening of the wholly interstate problem areas
"to give priority to the most significant."37 If the states do not act
on the vast area that remains, consumer protection is left to "only the
willingness (and self-interest) of reputable businessmen to comply"
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
lack of authority noticeable in both the Council and the Conmis-
sion, as well as the Special Assistant. Each organization is charged with
the responsibility of 'advising, 'reviewing,' or 'consulting,' but none has
the power to modfy, execute or instigate any program of its own.
Existing programs designed to aid the consuer are in a state of dis-
array and reveal many deiciencies, but the Advisory Council and theCommittee can do no more than hope that their recommendations 
will
induce the President and Congress to take corrective 
action. Barber,
supra note 3, at 1214-15.
3g generally Hearings, 
supra note 18.
3' Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 21, 1969, 1 B, at 10, 
col. 1.
32 56 COLTI. L. Be., supra note 26, at 1022. See 
generally Kintr, Fed-
eral Trade Commission Regulations 
of Advertising, 64 Mnc. L. 
E. 1269 (1966);
Milstein, The Federal Trade Commission and Faise Advertising, 
64 COLU. L.
e. 439 (1964); Weston, Deceptive Advertising and 
the FederaI Trade Com-
mission, Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 Fe. B. J. 548 (1964).
3354 Iowa L. Re., supra note 2, at 322-23.
TCv. Bute, 312 U.S. 349 (1941); Hearings, supra note 
18, at 286
(testimony of Paul Rand Dixon, 
Chairman of the Federal Trade 
Commission).
t56 COLU. L. Rev., supra 
note 26, at 1023, citing Canfield 
Oil Co. v.
FTC, 274 F. 571 (6th Cir. 1921).
30 Id. at 1024-25, and sources 
therein.
37'r ANNUAL REIORT 1 (1967).
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with existing trade regulations, 38 with adjustment of those regula-
tions to meet new problems being impossible.
Compounding the fact that the restrictive scope of FTC ac-
tivities would frustrate an agency totally composed of zealous con-
suner protectors equipped with adequate legal weaponry is the
fact that the Commission cannot be so described. Its present oper-
ational procedure is to rely upon complaints rather than to ferret out
frauds,39 and when a case arises it takes approximately "a year to
reach the Commission level for issuance of a complaint."40 If the
respondent does not then consent to cease and desist the questioned
practice, it will often involve, "three to five years between issuance
of the complaint and the time when a cease and desist order becomes
final through exhaustion of the last opportunity for appeal."41 The
"classic example" is the legendary Holland Furnace Company case
which took approximately thirty years to satisfactorily terminate.42
While such delays reveal the necessity of such institutional reforms
as temporary injunctions, 43 they also reveal a questionable attitude
toward enforcement which makes it doubtful if such tools would be
utilized if available. Ralph Nader's findings, 44 recently buttressed by
the report of a distinguished Presidential panel of the Bar Associa-
tion,45 were that these "problem areas can be traced to purposeful
delay to protect certain interests .... 46 Both reports concluded this
was due to "cronyism"47 and because the FTC "has acquired and
38 Id.
39 N. Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
40 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 444, and sources cited therein.
41 Id.; see also Weston, supra note 32.
42The Holland salesmen posed as inspectors to dismantle fimaces and then,
by alarming the consumer of the supposed danger involved, high-pressured the
consumers into purchasing new healing units. The first complaints arose in the
early 1930's. CoNsumrm BULL., Apr. 1965, at 25. The company later agreed to
cease and desist certain practices. 24 F. T. C. 1413-14 (1936). There were still
numerous complaints thereafter. CONSUnm BULL., Apr. 1965 at 25-26. Yet, it
was 18 years later before the FTC filed another complaint and it didn't result in
another cease and desist order for four more years. 55 FTC 55 (1958). In two
appeals, this order was upheld. Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203
(7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960), and HollandFurnace Co. v.
FTC, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961). Thereafter, the Commissions imposition of
heavy fines for violations of the 1958 order was upheld. In re Holland Furnace
Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965). See Pnss.
Comm., supra note 13, at 45-46; Rice, supra note 15, at 606; Weston, supra note
32, at 566; 114 U. PA. L. Rev., supra note 19, at 444-45.4 3 PRs. Comm., supra note 13, at 47.44 See Bus. WEEr, Jan. 11, 1969, at 34; C-ANGING Tnmrs, April, 1969 at 17;
NEwswEx, Jan. 13, 1969, at 68; Tnvm, Jan. 17, 1969, at 18; Tnvm, Sept. 13,
1968, at 23.
45 "The study group's report bore a striking resemblance in content-and
even, to some degree, in language-to the report on the trade commission ...
by 'Nader's Raiders.' . . ." N.Y. Times, supra note 39, at 1, col. 1.46 
NEwswEsm, Jan. 13, 1969, at 68, quoting the report of "Nader's Raiders."
47 TnviM, Jan. 17, 1969, at 18, quoting Nader's report.
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elevated to important positions a number of staff members of in-
sufficient competence."48 The result is that the FTC is characterized
by "failure to establish priorities, excessive preoccupation with trivial
matters, undue delay and . . . has exercised little leadership in the
prevention of retail market frauds."49 It is therefore evident that the
FTC is failing to adequately protect the consumer even within the
narrow limits of its reach.
Consequently, there is left to the states a vast area of consumer
problems into which it must thrust an agency if its consuming citizenry
is to be adequately protected. Since the consumers are amateurs
vying with the professionals, they need not only coordinated laws for
their protection, but also state action to offset this disparity while
providing statewide supervision of the enforcement of the new legal
framework. 0 To avoid both the waste involved in duplication of
effort5' and the confusion to consumers from shuffled jurisdictions,
8 2
while providing a reliable source of consistent guidance for the com-
plying businessman, 53 this protective function must be centralized
in a single agency.
However, the solons should be careful not to vest these duties in
a new bureaucratic office, for "[i]ndustry domination of its adminis-
trative agency is a well known phenomenon."54 Whether accomplished
48 N. Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1969, at 29 (excerpts from the Bar Panel's report).
49 Id.
50 Rice, supra note 15, at 595-97; Spanogle, supra note 15, at 625-26; 114
U. PA. L. Rnv., supra note 19, at 429-33.
51 Rice, supra note 15, at 597.
82 Id. at 599.
53 Spanogle, supra note 15, at 629.
64 Id. at 626, citing Huntington, The Marasmus of the I.C.C.: The Commis-
sion, The Railroads and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L. J. 467 (1952); Hearings,
supra note 18, at 83 (testimony of Bronson C. LaFollette). A colorful and graphic
presentation of this point of view is that of Kurt Hanslowe:
Effective regulation necessarily seems to imply a position of domin-
ance on the part of the regulators....
The history of regulation, however, demonstrates an evolution in quite
the opposite direction-namely, one of industry dominance over the
regulators.
These experiences may be especially acute because of the particular
device which we have chosen as our main means for accomplishing reg-
ulation, the so-called independent, quasi-judicial administrative agency
or commission. This particular tool of government started out as a
rather ingenious hybrid of our constitutional system. Acting pursuant to
poers delegated to it by the legislature, and performing alike some
legislative, executive and judicial functions, the typical administrative
agency at the outset is especially designed to perform some particular
regulator job which none of the traditional branches seems capable of
discharging adequately.
Due to the particular locus in our constitutional scheme of such
agencies, they seem characteristically to undergo a life cycle which cul-
(continued on next page)
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by political chicanery or simply by the appointment of an industry
representative to be the commissioner:
[I]t is unlikely that such a commissioner would be an aggressive
"ombudsman' representing the consumer, thus reducing the con-
sumer's protection to a minimal or illusory level. The consumer
needs more than the enforcement of those provisions of the statute
which are clear against violations which are equally clear. He
also needs protection against questionable conduct ... which re-
quires test cases where the statute is unclear, or even silent, and
the . . . conduct is ambiguous. It also requires the development
of new theories supporting action, and this may be accomplished
only by those who view the transactions as consumers.55
Clearly, the preferable alternative is to place the duty of pro-
tecting the consuming public upon an elected official who is thereby
directly responsible to the people. Since the duty will involve medi-
ating and evaluating consumer complaints with an eye toward the
possibility of litigation in the public interest, it should obviously be
borne by the state's legal staff, the Office of the Attorney General.56
Since this approach to consumer matters will require the full cooper-
ation of the defrauded consumers, 57 it is preferable that the state
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
minates in a static condition of ineffectuality. That is to say, they have
neither the political sensibility of the legislative branch, nor the po-
litical power of a dynamic executive branch, nor the independent strength
of the judiciary.
As a consequence, the typical agency emerges from a gestation
period when the reform pressures which caused its creation were en-
thusiasm in which the agency, though beginning to be removed from
the causative political forces, vigorously seeks to administer its regu-
lator policies both in the field and in the inevitably ensuing litigation.
Then comes maturity, accompanied by bureaucratization, regularity
and routine professionalization, judicialization (because of the abra-
sions of seekng judicial acceptance in the earlier stages), and an in-
creasingly smoother modus vivendi with the regulated group. 'Polit-
ically isolated, lacking a firm basis of public support, lethargic in at-
titude and approach, bowed down by precedent and backlogs, unsup-
ported in its demands for more staff and money, the commission finally
becomes a captive of the re guated group.
There follows a period of debility and decline. Identification by the
administrative agency with the interests of the regulated sector becomes
virtually complete. The agency becomes a capstone for a particular
industry, serving more as its protector than its regulator. Personnel moves
[sic] readily from agency to industry. In fact, the agency, by its in-
creasingly automatic approval of what the industry wants, serves as
legitimizer of what the industry does. The regulated sector becomes
insulated from-regulationl Hanslowe, Regulation By Visible Public and
Invisible Private Government, 40 Tzx. L. B. 88, 114-16.
55 Spanogle, supra note 15, at 627.
56 Rice supra note 15, at 601-02.
57 Mindell, The New York Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection-A




official involved be the holder of such a traditional, respected office
rather than a new part of governmental bureaucracy by its nature
too often distrusted. Furthermore, since Kentucky's Attorney Gen-
eral already has an operative Division of Consumer Protection, its
expansion would entail less cost and none of the delay involved in
establishing a new agency. It is also important to note that since
about twenty-seven of the thirty states with such an agency locate it in
their Attorney General's Office,58 the Commonwealth can best benefit
from the experience of her sister states by utilizing the same office.
Kentucky has already become involved in the National Association of
Attorneys Generals activities serving as a forum for the exchange of
ideas and a fulcrum for interstate cooperation.
The only rationale for giving preference to a special agency is
its ability to acquire particular expertise in the subject matter,
60
an argument that loses some validity when one considers the political
overtones of appointments to and conduct of such offices. 61 Further-
more, the expertise argument is most applicable to those agencies
involved in daily regulatory functions, whereas in the administration
of consumer protection laws, "the focus would be upon the handling
of complaints" 2 and the mediation or litigation of them. And finally,
whatever expertise which nevertheless may be necessary can be as
easily obtained by a Division within the Department of Law as by an
agency somewhere in the morass of the administrative branch of state
government.
In sum, then, the imbalance in the market between seller and
buyer and the immense cost to both resulting from the schemes of
the unscrupulous make it imperative that government act as the con-
58 A 1968 student research project concluded that twenty-five of twenty-eight
states placed principal authority for consumer matters in the Office of the At-
torney General. S. Douglas, State Attorney General Consumer Protection Pro-
grams, June 1, 1968. Since then, at least two additional state enactments place
the authority in the Attorney General's Office. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 75.1-1 et. seq.
(Supp. VII, 1969); Colo. H. B. 1030 (1969).
59 Kentucky's Attorney General was host to such a National Seminar on
Consumer Protection in October, 1969, under the auspices of the National As-
sociation of Attorneys General (N.A.A.G.). It was a successor to a similar Seminar
held in Baltimore, Maryland in May of 1969. The Seminar in Baltimore was
arranged during a meeting of the Southern Region of N.A.A.G. in Lexington,
Kentucky in April of 1969. Thereafter, the National Conference of N.A.A.G.,
meeting in the Virgin Islands in June of 1969, officially resolved itself that suchmeetings should become a continuing program of the Association. The LouisvilleSeminar was the first in this continuing program. Interview with Assistant Attorney
General Robert V. Bullock, Chief, Consumer Protection Division, Kentucky Dept.of Law, Sept. 8, 1969. See also Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 30, 1969, § A,
at 15, col 1. 9 Rice, supra note 15, at 600.
0G See notes 44-49 and 54 supra, and accompanying text.2 Rice, supra note 15, at 603.
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sumer protector. Furthermore, whether or not the federal government
discharges the share of the duty it has undertaken, a large area will
be left to state efforts, which can best be directed by the Attorney
General.
INADEQUACIES OF PRESENT KENTUCKY LAW
To detail the plight of the Kentucky consumer, it is helpful to
view an illustrative example of well known frauds and the inability
of the victims to obtain redress. Although this example is purely
imaginary, it represents a typical consumer's experience.
On Sunday, the following advertisement appeared in John Wilson's
hometown newspaper:
Repossessed 1969 "Brand-Name" zig-zag sewing machine.
Limited number available! No down-paymentl Brand name
machines at 60%, off!63 No gimmicks. No extras. Machine for
$90. Call now-State Sewing Machine, Inc.64 299-0055.
John read the ad several times. Although he was nearing retirement
age65 with a barely adequate income, 66 he decided to look into such
a bargain for his wife.
The following afternoon John stopped by State Sewing Machine
on his way home from work. The salesman told John the machines
advertised were no longer in stock, all of them having been sold
that morning, and that "they were not that good anyway." He sug-
gested that John purchase a "quality machine that had not been
"used," priced at "only" $199.95.67 When John hesitated, the salesman
63 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 398 n.25
The question is 60% of what? This is normally 60% off a high in-
flated price. Id.64 "Many small and 'fly by night operations' adopt a name that sounds
very impressive and resembles, perhaps, one which has a high standing
and reputation, often including words such as 'International,' 'U.S.'...
or the name of a state, which seems to give them size and stature, or
suggests a large and responsible organization." CONsum BULL., March,
1964, at 39.
65 The National Better Business Bureau had included as one of the ten most
serious consumer frauds the deceiving of the elderly.
No. 8, Victimizing the Aged: Appeals made to the insecurity, dwindling
mental alertness and loneliness of the aged, to separate them from their
life savings, retirement and insurance income. 0 Connell, supra note 7,
at 231-32.
66 The consumer should not make financial commitments which will be bard
or impossible to meet. A member of the buying public should make sure that
he knows the entire cost of each transaction he makes including credit. Ky. DEPrT
oF LAw, TEN DANGER SIGNALS IN BUYING (1969).
67 John has just been "baited and switched." Bait advertising has been de-
fined as:
... not a bona fide offer, but an alluring offer to sell something which
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 58
reminded him that he need not make a down-payment and that he
could afford the small interest charge of less than a dollar a week.
Even though John had never heard of this brand sewing machine
and although it carried no written guarantee, the salesman persuaded
John that it was a "superior" product and that he would "personally"
guarantee it for one year. Relying upon the oral representation of
the salesman, John signed the contract.6
While John had been purchasing the sewing machine, a young
lady had come to the Wilson's home telling Mary Wilson that she was
taking a survey for a nationwide firm concerning the types of appli-
ances the average family owned. Mary supplied the information she
requested.69 A few days later, a young man appeared at the Wilson's
home and announced that Mary had won a wonderful prize,70 a
"Health-O-Matic' vacuum cleaner. He stated it was so effective in
reducing the dust level in the area cleaned that it was a boon to
anyone with a respiratory affliction.71 Mary, who suffered from hay
fever, was thrilled at the thought of her great fortune. However, having
gained entrance, the salesman then disclosed that actually there
would be a "small fee" of approximately $250.00 for the vacuum,72
a type that has a unit installed in every room.7 3 But, he explained that
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the advertiser does not sincerely want to sell or tries not to sell or de--"' X avoids selling. Its purpose is to get the customer into the store
.aiesman into the home so as then to sell something else instead,
usually at a higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the ad-
vertiser. Comment, Mindell, supra note 57, at 612.08 Kentucky consumers are warned by a publication of the Attorney General's
Office that oral guarantees are of no value, but are used by salesmen to induce
the consumer to purchase an inferior product. The consumer is legally bound by
what the contract says, not what a salesman tells him. Ky. DEP'T or LAw, supra
note 66.
69 Companies that specialize in door-to-door sales often use the survey method
to determine if the consumer would he interested in their product. It can be seen
that on its face that this tactic is extremely deceptive. Id.
70 Unsolicited salesmen use gimmicks such as "you have won a prize" or a
"bond of friendship" to gain entrance into residences to enable them to give their
sales pitch. This, as shown by the text, is also deceptive on its face. Companies
figure that if they can gain entrance to the dwelling there is a good chance they
can make a sale. Id.71 The National Better Business Bureau has estimated that health gimmicks
account for well over a billion dollars annually.
No. 9. Health Quackery: Reducing pills, bust developers, hair restorers,
virility pills,' cancer and arthritis cures-well over a billion dollars an-
nually. O'Connell, supra note 7, at 231-32.7 2 As with guarantees, oral estimates are no assurance that the consumer
will receive the bill he expected. The consumer should get a written assurance that
no additional charges, over and above those in writing on a contract, will be
made without his consent. Ky. DEP'T OF LAw, supra note 66.
73 The fact that the vacuum had a unit installed in every room qualified it
as a home improvement. According to the National Better Business Bureau, losses
due to home improvement schemes amount to $500 million a year.
(Continued on next page)
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this would be covered through a new sales plan. The company would
pay Mary $25 per month for a year for using her home as a demon-
stration model, enabling her not only to pay for the cleaner, but also
to make a profit 74 Since the monthly payments Mary would receive
would cover the cost of the machine, the terms of the agreement
were discussed as mere formalities and she signed the blank con-
tract given her by the salesman.75
A few days later, John and Mary received a letter from a finance
company which, in part, stated:
Dear Friends:
In view of your fine credit rating and excellent character
references, the Friendly Finance Company, Inc. has agreed to
finance your recent purchase of a sewing machine from the
State Sewing Machine Company and a vacuum cleaner
from Health-O-Matic Industries.
You have signed two instruments, one for the sewing
machine which provides for 36 monthly payments at $6.20
per month.... First payment due October 1.
The second instrument for the vacuum cleaner which pro-
vides for 36 monthly payments of $10.40 per month ...
First payment due October 15.
Though not mentioning the fee Mary was to receive for '7qe of the
house as a "Model Home," the terms were correct, so the i. _.
paid little attention to the letter.76 It was not until several weeks later
that the vacuum was delivered. When it was finally installed, Mary
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
No. 2 Home Improvement Swindles: Hidden trust deeds executed without
knowledge or consent of homeowners; phony bargains, tricky financing,
guarantees not honored, materials misrepresented and performances
exaggerated. Losses estimated at $500 milion a year. O'Connell, supra
note 7 at 231-32.
74Deaers induce the consumer to purchase their product by making the
representation that it will enable him to earn some money and thereby pay for
the product. The National Better Business Bureau includes this scheme in its ten
most serious consumer frauds.
No. 10. Work at Home Gyps: Gimmick ads to sell overpriced and shoddy
equipment that fails to earn the income represented. Id.
75Blank contracts or contracts with blank spaces therein are used by dis-
honest salesmen. The salesman orally agrees to one set of facts but after the
deal is closed he inserts into the contract terms more advantageous to him, or
omits oral representations the buyer has relied on. As stated before, the consumer
is bound by what the contract says not what the fraudulent salesman tells him.
Ky. DEP'T ov LAw, supra note 66.76 Mary has just fallen prey to a blank contract and an oral estimate. The
contract Mary signed contained nothing about a fee she would receive for use
of her home and the sum of the monthly payment of $10.40 per month was
considerably more than the oral estimate of $300. Id.
[Vol. .58
discovered that the walls where the outlets were made had been
damaged.
The next day John wrote to Health-O-Matic Industries. Two weeks
passed and the Wilsons had not received a reply. During this time
the sewing machine had proved to be defective. John went to State
Sewing Machine to see the salesman that had sold him the machine,
but was told that he no longer worked for the company. Furthermore,
the company stated that the machine was not guaranteed.77
Since it would be impossible to use the house as a "Model Home"
until the walls were repaired and since the sewing machine was
defective, John refused to make the first payments when they be-
came due. The finance company sent a courteous note asking for
payment and stating that appropriate action would be taken if John
did not pay. John telephoned Health-O-Matic, but the company de-
nied any responsibility, claiming the damage was done by ABC In-
stallation Company who installed the machine, and refused to alter
the price. The next day John learned that ABC was no longer in
business.
By now another payment was past due and the finance company
was becoming more insistent. When John went to the finance com-
pany, he was told he would have to pay, that the finance company
was a "holder-in-due-course" and that his only recourse was against
the sewing machine and vacuum cleaner companies.7 8 John had heard
of the term "holder-in-due-course" before, but he had not imagined
that he would have to pay the finance company if the products were
defective. In spite of this, he refused to pay unless the companies
satisfied his demands.
The finance company then notified him that it would sue on the
debt he owed the company and levy against his house if he did not
pay the entire balance immediately.79
77 Oral guarantee discussed note 68 supra.
78 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 414.
The factor singled out.., as the largest problem in the consumer fraud
area-the mask behind which fraud bides' is the ability of financial
agencies, absent regulation in retail sales acts, to purchase installment
contracts free from responsibility for fraudulent practices perpetrated by
dealers. Id.
The Uniform Commercial Code protects a financial institution that buys
negotiable consumer paper as a holder in due course, unless the con-
sumer can prove: (1) that the holder had notice that . . . the instru-
ment is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or
claim to it on the part of any person; or (2) that the consumer signed the
note under such misrepresentation that he had 'neither knowledge nor
reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its eharacer or essential
terms.' Id. citing UirFoRm CoMMERcrAL ConE § 3-302, 3-305.
79 Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 288.580 (1960).
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John had been told that the Better Business Bureau could help
consumers in situations such as his. Upon contacting the Bureau,
and after the companies had denied responsibility, he was informed
that complaints such as his were forwarded to the Consumer Pro-
tection Division of the Office of the Attorney General of Kentucky. 0
Shortly thereafter, he received a letter from the Attorney Gen-
erars Office acknowledging receipt of his complaint and informing
him that the office would take appropriate action and he would be
notified of the companies' response. A few days later, he received
another letter from the Attorney General's Office advising him that
that office was not empowered to undertake any further action on his
complaint and that he should contact his local prosecutor or a pri-
vate attorney.81 The letter explained that if there is a private dispute
between the parties as to the facts of the matter, the complaint is
classified as a private controversy and that the office was not per-
mitted to intervene into what the courts have termed private con-
troversies. The letter further disclosed that the Attorney General has
the authority to enforce only three statutes that are relevant to "con-
sumer protection": (1) the "Advertising and Wholesale Act" 82 which
protects the public from those retailers who misrepresent their goods
as being sold at wholesale price; (2) the "Going Out of Business
Act"813 which protects the public from misleading advertising con-
cerning going-out-of-business, lost-our-lease, fire-sales, and the like,
and (3) the "Chain Merchandising Act"84 which protects the public
from referral selling.
80 This is the usual practice in central Kentucky. Since the forming of the
Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General of Kentucky,
the Better Business Bureau has forwarded complaints to that division. Letters on
file in the Office of the Attorney General of Kentucky.
81 This is the normal procedure in the Attorney General's Consumer Protec-
tion Division. A letter is sent out acknowledging the consumer's complaint and
informing him that he will be notified of the company's response. A second letter
is sent to the complained-of company, relating the facts of the complaint to them
and asking for their position in the matter. If the respondent company denies
responsibiliy or replies that the complainant stated the facts incorrectly, the
complaint is a "private controversy" and the consumer is told that he should
contact his local prosecutor or a private attorney. Letters on file in the Office of
the Attorney General of Kentucky.
82KRS § 365.490 (1966) prohibits the use of the word "wholesale" in the
advertisement of merchandise that is being sold to the general public.
83 KRS § 365.415 (1966) requires a merchant to acquire a license before
conducting a "going-out-of-business," "lost-our-lease," or "fire" sale.
84KRS § 436.360 (1944) prohibits lotteries, gift enterprises and chain
merchandising in the Commonwealth.
Chain merchandising has been interpreted to include the scheme known as
referral selling. Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1966).
Referral selling is a sales-scheme through which the consumer is induced to
purchase a product by the offer that he will receive a set amount of money if
and only if a demonstration is given or a sale is made to a prospective buyer
(Continued on next page)
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Unless the activity of which the consumer complains falls within
the boundaries of one of the above-mentioned statutes, the Attorney
Generars Office can only offer its services in mediation and hope for
voluntary cooperation by the respondent company. This lack of
statutory power and the smallness of the staff have severely limited
the efforts of the Consumer Protection Division to assist the public.
In 1968 and through August, 1969, the Attorney Generars Consumer
Protection Division (C.P.D.), which is staffed by one full-time at-
torney and one full-time secretary and has no separate budget, saved
the consumers of Kentucky only approximately $4,200. However,
this sum does not include those instances where intervention by the
C.P.D. has resulted in such accommodations as delivery, repair and
return of merchandise and cancellation of some unconscionable con-
tracts.85
In other states that have "Consumer Protection Acts" similar to the
proposal herein discussed and whose consumer protection divisions
are better staffed and financed, the amount of savings for the con-
sumer has been substantially larger. In Illinois, for example, the At-
torney General's Consumer Fraud Division has, since 1961, returned
$1,500,000 to the consumer through mediation and $600,000 by liti-
gation. In Iowa, where in 1965 the legislature adopted a "Consumer
Fraud Act" similar to the Kentucky proposal, the Attorney General's
Consumer Protection Division estimated that $10,000 to $12,000
was returned to consumers each year by litigation alone, not includ-
ing mediation. In Maryland, in ten months, $125,000 was returned to
consumers. In Missouri, $15,000 by litigation.86
Due to his reluctance and relative inability to pay a private at-
torney, John turned first to the local prosecutor. After listening to
his complaint, the prosecutor telephoned the representatives of the
respective companies who again denied responsibility. In the prose-
cutor's opinion, there was no criminal sanction under which John
could obtain relief. He informed John that Kentucky, as do most
states,87 has a "Printers' Ink Statute" 88 which makes it a misdemeanor to
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
he refers to the company. It is doubtful that the plan under which Mary Wilson
purchased the vacuum cleaner would constitute referral selling because Mary
was not required to refer any prospective customers.85 Letter from John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky, October
3, 1969, on file in University of Kentucky Law Library.86 Douglas, supra note 58, at 11-13, 16.
87 56 CoLum. L. REv., Supra note 26, at 1058; Note, Deceptive Advertising,
80 HAv. L. REv. 1005, 1123 (1967); Note, State Consumer Protection: A Pro-
posal, 53 IowA L. REv. 710, 716 (1967).
88 KRS 434.270 (1942): Any person who,
directly or indirectly, displays or exhibits to the public in any manner,
(Continued on next page)
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engage in false or misleading advertising. However, he stated that it
was rarely if ever used89 due to the burden of proof required in en-
forcing criminal statutes and the restrictive interpretations given the
statute by many courts. The prerequisites for criminal prosecution,
namely knowledge of the falsity of the statements made and intent to
deceive make it difficult to obtain a conviction under a criminal
statute such as "Trinters' Ink."
The original "Printers' Ink Model Statute,"90 after which Kentucky
Revised Statute [hereinafter cited as KRS] Section 434.270 and most
state statutes prescribing a penal sanction for false advertising are
modeled, did not require the elements of knowledge or intent in
order to obtain a conviction.91 However, Kentucky was among the
states which, in the course of enactment, added the requirements of
scienter, i.e. that the advertiser had both knowledge of the falsity of
his statements and an intent to deceive.92 These substantial evidentiary
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
whether by handbill, placard, poster, picture, film or otherwise; inserts
or causes to be inserted in any publication; issues, exhibits or in any way
distributes or disseminates to the public; or delivers, exhibits, mails or
sends to any other person any false or misleading statement, representa-
tion or advertisement, with intent to sell, barter or exchange any goods,
wares or merchandise or any thing of value; or to deceive or mislead any
other person to purchase, discount or in any way invest in or accept as
collateral security any bonds, bill, share of stock, note, warehouse re-
ceipt or any security; or to make any loan upon or invest in any property
of any kind; or uses any of such advertising methods with the purpose
of deceiving or misleading any other person to employ, for a valuable
consideration, the services of any person advertising such services, shall
be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or be imprisoned for not
more than sixty days, or both. If a corporation violates this section, it
shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, and its president, or
other officers who are responsible for the management of the corpora-
tion, shall be imprisoned for not more than sixty days.
89 No appellate decision has ever been handed down concerning KRS §
434.270. KRS ANN. § 434.270 (Baldwin 1968).
Concerning Printers' Ink Statutes it has been stated that:
[Miost jurisdictions have never used the statutes at all, and that
only a few have initiated more than a handful of prosecutions. 56 COLum.
L. REV., supra note 26, at 1063.
90 The "Printers' Ink Model Statute was drafted in 1911 for an advertising
journal of that name. 56 CoLum. L. R-EV., supra note 26, at 1058.
91 "The Printers' Ink Model, which carries the penal sanction of a mis-
demeanor, requires proof of only three elements: (1) an intent to sell,
dispose of, or increase the consumption of, goods or services- (2) the
placing before the public, with such intent, of any type of advertising;
and (3) the existence in such advertising, of a statement or representa-
tion of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading. Its purpose is to
make the advertiser absolutely liable for what he says, without requiring
the often difficult proof of reliance by the actual purchaser, intent to
deceive, or actual knowledge of the improper character of the advertise-
ment by the defendant." Id.92 It is evident on the face of the Kentucky statute that intent is required.
The relevant provisions of the statute state:
KRS § 434.270 (1942): (Continued on next page)
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barriers to conviction have seriously undermined the effectiveness of
the statute.
93
However, if the elements of knowledge and intent were not re-
quired, the statute would still be totally inadequate. Of course, as
under all criminal statutes, the general requirement that guilt must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is applicable.94 Along with
this, criminal provisions must be strictly construed and the activity
must be clearly within the boundaries of the prohibition.9 5 A con-
sequence of this latter requirement is, for example, the widespread
feeling that the prohibitions of 'Trinters' Ink" do not apply to "bait
and switch advertising."96 The strict construction given the statute by
the courts limiting its substantive coverage to false representation of
fact has resulted in defenses based on a distinction between fact and
opinion.9 "'There is some authority that neither opinion nor prom-
issory statements are embraced by the statute."5 Thus if a merchant
makes a representation that is considered to be merely his opinion or
his promise, he is not liable for its veracity.
The restrictive interpretations given criminal statutes by many
courts have also been felt in the realm of the false pretense statute.99
It is generally held that to constitute a false pretense there must be a
misrepresentation of an existing or past fact.100 Thus, false pretense
statutes do not cover false promises concerning future acts, even if
the promise was made with no intent to perform. 0 This is the ac-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
... with intent to sell, barter or exchange any goods, wares or merch-
andise or any thing of value; or to deceive or mislead any other person
to purchase ...
See 56 CoLum. L. REv., supra note 26, at 1060-61; Note, Deceptive Adver-
tising, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1005, 1123 (1967); Note, State Consumer Protection:
A Proposal, 53 IowA L. REv. 710, 716 (1967).9 3 Mindell, supra note 58, at 616; Note, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of
Consumer Protection, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 590 n.5 (1966); 56 COLUM. L. REv.,
supra note 26, at 1060-61; Note, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAstv. L. Rev. 1005,
1123 (1967); Note, State Consumer Protection: A Proposal, 53 IowA L. REv. 710,
716 (1967).9 4 Note, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAsv. L. 11v. 1005, 1123 (1967); Note,
State Consumer Protection: A Proposal, 53 IowA L. REv. 710, 716 (1967).95 Note, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 33 U. Cm.
L. RE;v. 590 591 n 5 (1966); Note, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAstv. L. REV. 1005,
1123 (1961).
96 56 CoLum. L. 1Ev., supra note 26, at 1063; Comment 35 N.D. L. REv.
164, 165 (1959).
97 56 COLUm. L. REv., supra note 26, at 1061; Note, Desceptive Advertising,
80 HA V. L. REv. 1005, 1123 (1967).
98 56 COLUM. L. RIv., supra note 26, at 1061.99 Note, State Consumer Protection: A Proposal, 53 IowA L. 11Ev. 710, 717
(1967); 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 424-25.
1005 3 IowA L. REv., supra note 99, at 717; 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note
19, at 424-25.
10153 IowA L. REv., supra note 99, at 717: 114 U. PA. L. Rv., supra note
19, at 424-25.
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cepted construction given to KRS 434.050, Kentucky's "False Pretense
Statute."0 2
Another weakness of criminal legislation is that these statutes do
not permit local prosecutors to make a direct assault upon widespread
deceptive practices, but requires them to resort to a multiplicity of
actions in isolated cases as the means of enforcement. It has been
stated:
...[T]he determination in criminal proceedings that a practice
is deceptive has no binding effect in subsequent proceedings. IF
the county attorney wishes to halt a widespread deceptive practice
he must prosecute all subsequent violations by the businessman
in individual actions. Therefore, the sanctions imposed in the iso-
lated case must be sufficient alone to deter future violations .... 103
But, as previously noted, most criminal statutes of this nature provide
only nominal sanctions. 04
Yet, even if the overworked'0 5 prosecutor believes that a particular
activity falls within the prohibitions of a statute, he rarely prosecutes.
This is due to both a generally held belief that, except in the most
flagrant circumstances, businessmen should not be treated like crim-
inals'0 6 and to the political repercussions inherent in prosecuting local
businessmen for what may seem to be no worse than an excess of
capitalistic enthusiasm.10 He simply chooses to prosecute more serious
crimes, leaving deceptive advertising unregulated. 05
In any event, most consumers are not sufficiently outraged by
deceptive advertising to take the time to file a criminal complaint
102 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tidwell, 162 Ky. 114, 172 S.W. 102 (1915);
Commonwealth v. Warren, 94 Ky. 615, 23 S.W. 193 (1893); Commonwealth
v. Moore, 89 Ky. 542, 12 S.W. 1066 (1890). The rule developed by the line of
cases yields the following conclusion:
In summary, it is our opinion that a mere false promise to do some-
thing in the future unaccompanied by any misrepresentation of present
of past fact, will not sustain a conviction under KRS § 434.050, whereas
a false promise, coupled with a false representation as to a present or
past fact, is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the statute, the other
elements of the offense being present. 67 Op. ATr'Y GEr. 209 (1967).
103 53 IowA L. REv., supra note 99, at 717.
104 The sanctions provided in ICRS § 434.270 (1942) are as follows:
... shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or be imprisoned
for not more than sixty days, or both.
105 56 CoLum. L. REV., supra note 26, at 1064; 80 HMAv. L. REV., supra note
97, at 1123.
106 Note, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 33 U.
Cm. L. REv. 590, 591 n.5 (1966); 80 HAnv. L. R1v., supra note 97, at 1123; 114
U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 426-27.
107 80 HAsv. L. REv., supra note 97, at 1123.
108 56 CoLum. L. REv., supra note 26, at 1064; 80 HAlv. L. 1Ev., supra note
97, at 1123; 53 IowA L. REv., supra note 99, at 716; 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra
note 19, at 426-27.
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and testify at trial, 0 9 especially since the prosecutor cannot get their
money back.110 Thus, it is apparent that criminal legislation does
not adequately protect the consuming public.
The prosecutor advised John to see a private attorney for advice
on the question of civil remedies. When he finally contacted an at-
torney, the result again was disappointing. The lawyer told him that
he could bring an action for deceit against the companies for falsely
representing their products in an advertisement or at the time of sale.I"
However, he stated that the difficulty of proving the elements of this
action made it too cumbersome to effectively protect consumer in-
terests. At common law it was generally held that:
In order to recover in deceit, the consumer was required to
show that he had reasonably relied on a misrepresentation of fact
knowingly made by a merchant with the intent to deceive. Not
only was it extremely difficult for the consumer to prove the
merchant's intent to deceive, but it was also difficult for him to
establish that his reliance on the misrepresentation was reason-
able. Even if these difficulties were overcome, the consumer still
was required to show that a verifiable fact had been misrepre-
sented and that the representation was not privileged as mere
puffing."i 2
Today, however, the courts are gradually becoming more liberal
as to what is required to establish an action in deceit. In some juris-
dictions neither scienter nor intent is any longer required, thus allow-
ing restitution to be granted when the merchant has made an unin-
tentional misrepresentation without knowledge of the falsity of his
statement."1
3
In Kentucky, however, the rule is well settled that intent and
scienter are still required for deceit." 4 Hence, the present Kentucky
rule, found in McGuffin v. Smith," 5 is simply the old rule which
other states have modified. In McGuffin, the court held that in order
to constitute actionable deceit, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) That the defendant made a material misrepresentation;
(2) that it was false; (3) that when he made it he knew that it
was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its
truth, and as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it with the
109 80 HiAv. L. REv., supra note 97, at 1123; 53 IowA L. REv., supra note
99, at 717.
110 80 HIAv. L. REv., supra note 97, at 1123; 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note
19, at 424.
111 53 Iowa L. REv., supra note 99, at 717.
112 Id. at 712-13.
113 Comment, 44 Ky. L. J. 112, 113 (1955).
"14 Id.
115 215 Ky. 606, 286 S.W. 884 (1926).
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intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff; (5) that
the plaintiff acted in reliance upon it, and (6) that he thereby
suffered injury.1i 6
In addition to the modifications in deceit, most courts today recog-
nize the doctrine of equitable rescission by which the consumer may
have a contract rescinded without proving knowledge, recklessness,
nor intent to deceive."17 In fact, "Kentucky is practically the only
state which requires proof of an intent to deceive" and scienter, i.e.
knowledge "before an equitable rescission can be secured."" 8 In re-
fusing to rescind the contract allegedly procured by fraud, the court
in the leading case of Livermore v. Middlesborough Town-Lands
Company"9 held:
To establish actionable fraud, or fraud against which equity
will relieve-and, as we have seen, the same rule applies in
Kentucky to both classes of cases-it must appear that the misrep-
resentation was of a matter of material fact (as distinguished
from opinion), at the time or previously existing (and not a
mere promise for the future); must be relied upon by the person
whose action is intended to be influenced; and must be made with
knowledge of its falsity, or under circumstances which did not
justify a belief in its truth 2
0
The attorney told John that the easier rule upon which he could
have sued the sewing machine company, breach of warranty, was
unavailable in his case because the contract he signed contained a
disclaimer clause.12 Although the Uniform Commercial Code, as
adopted in Kentucky, has abolished the requirement of privity of con-
tract in an action for breach of warranty, 22 and even though it has
expanded the concept of breach of warranty from its common law
definition, 23 it has not proved to be a sufficient consumer remedy
due to the fact that many warranties may be disclaimed if the re-
quirements of the Code are met. 24
In addition to the strictly "legal" inadequacies of the civil reme-
116 Id. at 612, 286 S.W. at 886.
117 44 Ky. L. J., supra note 113, at 115.
118 Id. at 114.
"19 106 Ky. 140, 50 S.W. 6 (1899).
12o Id. at 163, 50 S.W. at 13.
121 The attorney had called the sewing machine company that stated that
the contract John Wilson had signed contained a disclaimer clause. Note 75
supra discusses blank contracts.
122 KRS § 355.2-318 (1958).
123 KRS §§ 355.2-314-15 (1958). At the common law not only was "privity"
required for breach of warranty, but "dealers talk-puling" was privileged and the
consumer had to prove his reliance on the representation given him by the busi-
nessman. 53 IowA L. REv., supra note 99, at 713.
124KRS § 355.2-316 (1958).
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dies for the consumer, there are also some practical drawbacks. Most
of the time the consumer will have no personal knowledge of the
illegality of the activity that he believes to be unfair.125 This is especi-
ally true of such groups as the poor and the minorities who are hit
the hardest by the fraudulent operators.12 6 Even to those aware of an
applicable legal remedy, the cost of the litigation will be more than
the small stakes he will recover in a successful action.127 All of these
elements-the small stakes usually involved in individual consumer ac-
tions, the expense of the litigation and the consumer's lack of legal
knowledge-add up to the discouragement of litigation.
28
At the suggestion of his attorney, John then went to the legal
aid society as a last effort to obtain help but was informed that since
his income was in excess of the maximum allowed, he could not be
represented by legal aid.
29
The result of John's experience was a bill for $597.60, a defective
sewing machine, a house with damaged walls, and a conclusion that
"nobody is helping the consumer."
TH. KENTucK Busmss AND CoN suMM PROTECTION Acr
The legislative enactment which the Attorney General's Con-
sumer Council proposed to alleviate these barriers to legal redress
for defrauded consumers can best be commented upon by sections.1 0
Section 2. Declaration of Purpose
The purpose of this Act shall be to protect business and con-
sumers from misrepresentation and deceptive practices in the con-
duct of any trade or commerce in part or wholly within this Com-
monwealth.
Section 8. Definitions
As used in this Act-unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Advertisement" means the attempt by publication, dissem-
ination, solicitation or circulation to induce, directly or indirectly,
125 Spanogle, supra note 15, at 639; 53 IowA L. REV., supra note 99, at 715.
126 Rice, supra note 15, at 569.
127 O'Connell, supra note 7, at 231; 33 U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 106, at
590; 53 IowA L. REv., supra note 99, at 715-16; 114 U. PA. L. BRy., supra note
19, at 409.
128 U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 106, at 595.
29 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 403.
30 All citations to and sections reprinted of the Kentucky Business and Con-
sumer Protection Act are to the draft which was announced to the public on Sep-
tember 19, 1969. See note 2 supra.
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any person to enter into any obligation, or acquire any title or
interest in any merchandise or service;
(b) "Merchandise" includes any objects, wares, goods, commodi-
ties, intangibles, real estate, or anything offered, directly or indi-
rectly, to the public for sale;
(c) "Service" means any maintenance, repair, advice, counsel, or
treatment by any person in the conduct of any occupation;
(d) "Person" means any domestic or foreign individual, corpora-
tion, government, or governmental subdivision or agency, business,
estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated association, two or more
of any of the foregoing having a joint or common interest, or any
other legal or commercial entity;
(e) "Sale" means any sale, rental or distribution, offer for sale,
rental or distribution, or attempt directly or indirectly to sell, rent
or distribute any merchandise or service for cash or on credit.
The relative uniqueness for this type law of a declaration of pur-
pose' 3 ' is surprising in view of its importance and utility.
Like other regulatory and protective legislation, consumer laws
are couched in broad, inclusive language in order to preclude loop-
holes that permit either exoneration of practices intended to be out-
lawed or allowance of enforcement procedures and outright har-
assment which the legislature wished not to authorize. The very
comprehensiveness may boomerang, however, and every provi-
sion that seeks to close a loophole may have the effect of increas-
ing ambiguity and confusion. Consequently, in order to guide ad-
ministrative and judicative application of a consumer fraud law,
a 'purpose and construction' section is useful.' 32
Like all similar consumer protection statutes, this proposal for
Kentucky has quite liberally-framed definitions to insure the broad
application requisite to be effective in assisting the consuming
public.
1 3
131 Apparently only two other states have included a declaration of purpose
section in the basic consumer protection statute. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b)
(Supp. VII, 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451 (Supp. 1969).
132 Memorandum from Dean Robert M. Viles, Chairman, to the Legislation
Committee of the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Council, April 7, 1969.
333 Twenty-three states have a basic statutory prohibition of deceptive prac-
tices which can be called a consumer protection law. Ariz. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521
et. seq. (Supp. May 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-111 et. seq. (Supp. 1967);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 2511-2537 (Supp. 1968); HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 480-1
et. seq. (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2 §§ 261-271 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1969); IowA CODE § 713.24 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-601 et. seq. (Supp.
1968); MD. CODE ANN. art. 83, §§ 19-27 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93A, (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325.78-.80 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 407.010-.130 (Vernon Supp. 1969); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 et. seq., as
amended, (Supp. 1969); N. M. STAT. ANN. Ch. 49-15-1 et. seq. (Supp. 1969);
(Continued on next page)
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Taken together, the definitions of advertisement and sale extend
the reach of the Act to almost every conceivable transaction, or stage
of a transaction, in which the consumer could be defrauded. This is
accomplished, first, by defining advertisement as an attempt, not
necessarily successful, directly or indirectly, to induce any type of
positive act by the consumer. Secondly, by including "rental or dis-
tribution," as well as attempt or offer to sell, any narrow view of sale
is avoided. The combined effect of these two definitions is as exten-
sive a coverage as is provided by most such statutes today. However,
each one separately could be improved by the addition of various
innovations scattered among a few states.
The definition of advertisement could insure the broadness of its
coverage by providing that the enumerated methods of advertising
are covered whether the medium utilized is "visual, oral or written,"'134
"including labelling."135 Similarly, the inducement "not to enter"30 an
obligation should be covered as well as the affirmative act. In addi-
tion to inducements to acquire merchandise or services, those "to in-
crease the consumption thereof"137 should also be within the ambit of
the law. While all these facets may be covered by definitional clauses
like that in the present Kentucky proposal, 38 these suggestions are
meritorious if only to avoid litigation to prove that point. 39
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
N. Y. ExEc. LAw § 63 (12) (McKinney Supp. 1969); N. C. GE. STAT § 75.1-1
et seq. (Supp. VII, 1969); N. D. CENT. CODE ANN. ch. 51-15 (Supp. 1969);
PENN. STAT. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 et. seq. (Purdon Supp. V, 1968); R. I. GEN. LAWS
tit. 6, ch. 6-13.1, (Supp. II, 1968); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5069, ch. 10 (Ver-
non Supp. 1969), as amended, ch. 452, Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (1969); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9 §§ 2451-2462 (Supp. 1969); WAsH. REv. CODE. ch. 1986 (Supp.
1967); Colo. H. B. 1030 (1969). In addition, four states have deceptive adver-
tising statutes with provision for injunctive relief which, while considerably
narrower in scope than those laws cited above, do provide the state with some
legal weaponry for protecting the consumer. AiAs. STAT. §§ 45.50.470.510
(1962); CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE §§ 17530-17535 (West 1964); MicH. ComP.
LAws ANN. § 445.801-809 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.18.20 (1957).
134The Colorado definition of advertisement, otherwise identical to that
proposed for Kentucky, adds the phrase "visual, oral or written." Colo. H. B.
1030 § 1(6) (1969). Two other states insert the phrase "oral or written." MD.
ANN. CODE art. 83, § 20(a) (Supp. 1969); Anuz. BEv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521-1
(Supp. 1967).
'i5 Only Maryland specifically includes labelling in its definition of advertise-
ment. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 20(a) (Supp. 1969).
_ 3 GOnly New Jersey specifies inducements "not to enter" obligations in the
definition of advertisement. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 (a) (1967).
137 The New Jersey consumer protection act alone includes the phrase "or
increase the consumption thereof' in the definition of advertising. N. J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-1(a) (1967).
138At least three state statutes define advertisement in language identical to
that in the Kentucky proposal. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2511 (Supp. 1968);
IOWA CoDE § 713.24 (1)(a) (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.010(1) (Supp.
1967). The definition is similarly worded in the corresponding statues of two other
(Continued on next page)
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The proposed definition of sale is the most extensive such defini-
tion among corresponding legislation. Other than this Kentucky pro-
posal, only the New Jersey statute incorporates "rental or distribu-
tion."140 The one flaw which the Kentucky proposal may share with
seven other states is that the limiting terms "for cash or on credit"
could omit the transaction by barter.' 41 This possibility could be pre-
vented by following the lead of three states and substituting the term
"for any consideration" for the phrase "cash or on credit."142
While the language defining advertisement and sale incorporates
almost any transaction, the definitions of merchandise and service
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
states except that they append a clause specifically including advertisements
printed to resemble invoices, etc. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 261(a) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-601(a) (Supp. 1968). At least seven
states whose entire statute generally follows the Council of State Governments'
suggestion dont define advertisement at all. They are: Connecticut, Massachu-
setts, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas and Washington. See
COUNcIL. OF STATE GOVERNMENT', SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1967 [herein-
after cited as S.S.L. 1967] at 71. Minnesota neither follows S.S.L. 1967 nor de-
fines advertisement.
139 In addition to the suggestions in the text, comparable logic would suggest
the incorporation of the word "endorsement" among the synonyms meaning solici-
tation. See N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(a) (1967). It would also suggest structuring
the paragraph as "Advertisement includes any [thing] . . . which tends to in-
duce .. " N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(a) (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83,
§ 20(a) (Supp. 1969). Such an approach appears to be advantageous in flex-
ibility as compared to the present Kentucky proposal "Advertisement means the
attempt.., to induce. ... Such suggestions are in keeping with the philosophy
of this type legislation that inflexibility is to be avoided in every facet Incorpor-
ating all these suggestions the definition of advertisement would read as follows:
Advertisement-includes any publication, dissemination, solicitation en-
dorsement, or circulation, visual, oral or written, including labelling,
which tends to induce, directly or indirectly, any person to enter or not
to enter into any obligation, or acquire any title or interest in any merch-
andise or service or increase the consumption thereof. (Alterations em-
phasized).
140 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-1(e), as amended, (Supp. 1969). Five statesdefine sale in langage identical to that of Kentuck, and New Jersey except for
the omission of the words "rental or distribution.' DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, §
2511(d) (Supp. 1968); IOwA CODE § 713.24 (1)(d) (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch
121-1/2, § 261(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-601 (d)
(Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.101(4) (Supp. 1967). The language in
Maryland's corresponding provision is very similar, but not identical, to that of
these five states. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 20(e) (Supp. 1969). The eight states
which don't define advertisement, don't define sale either; Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas and Wash-
ington.
-
4 1 Corresponding statutes of at least seven other states use the term "for cash
or on credit" in the definition of sale. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2511(d) (Supp.
1968); IowA CODE § 713.24 (1)(d) (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §
261(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-604(d) (Supp. 1968);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 20(e) (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.101(4)
(Supp. 1967); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(e), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
142The three states using the phrase "for any consideration" are Arizona,
Colorado and Minnesota. Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521-5 (Supp. May 1967);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.78(2) (1966); Colo. H. B. 1030 § 1 (12) (1969).
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reach almost any conceivable subject for such a transaction. The defi-
nition of merchandise, like that of sale, follows the New Jersey
version.143 Its superiority lies in the addition of "or anything offered,
directly or indirectly, to the public for sale" to the otherwise fairly
common language.144 If enacted, the proposal will not only be but the
third such statute to define service, 145 but will also be the strongest
of the three. Its terms extend beyond the normal services like repair
and, quite properly and equitably, encompass even legal and medical
services, though the effect is limited by the exemptions of Section
5 of the proposed Act.146 In providing with great clarity the broad-
ness of scope required for effective consumer protection, these defi-
nitions of merchandise and service show superior draftsmanship.
The final term, person, is also defined in the manner of only one
other state. But this time the state is Connecticut' 4r and the provision
is not clearly superior to its counterparts. While the inclusion of "gov-
ernment, or governmental subdivision or agency" is a unique broad-
ening of the definitional scope, its failure to include the agent of the
various commercial entities named is a serious deficiency. Such a pro-
vision in the corresponding laws of fourteen other states makes them
comparatively stronger on this point.148
14
3 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(c), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
144Those statutes defining merchandise identically to the Kentucky and NewJersey language except for the omission of the clause "or anything offered, di-
rectly or indirectly, to the public for sale include at least three. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 83, § 20(b) (Supp. 1969); M-N. STAT. AiNN. § 325.78(2) (1966); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 407.101(2) (Supp. 1967). Two other states have enacted language
identical to that of these three except that the word service is added since they
do not separately define it. Aiuz. flxv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521-3 (Supp. May 1967);
DarL. CODE AN. tit. 6, § 2511(b) (Supp. 1968). Two other corresponding defi-
nitions are identical to those of Arizona and Delaware except that they limit the
term real estate by modifying it with the clause "situated outside the state." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 261(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-601(b) (Supp. 1968). Another corresponding statute utilizes the Arizona and
Delaware language except that it unnecessarily includes securities, bonds, de-
bentures etc. IOWA CODE § 713.24(1)(b) (1966). Colorado defines property
rather tan merchandise. Colo. H. B. 1030 § 1 (11) (1969). Vermonts defi-
nition simply refers to definitions elsewhere. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454(c)
(Supp. 1969). Several statutes which substantially duplicate S.S.L. 1967 dont
efine merchandise at all, including: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas and Washington.
145 The other two comparable statutes defining service are those of Maryland
and Vermont. MD. ANm. CODE art. 83, § 20(c) (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
§ 2454(c) (Supp. 1969).
14
0 See notes 202-03 infra and accompanying text.14 7 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-111(5) (Supp. 1967). The definition of person
in the recent Colorado enactment is identical to that of Connecticut and the
Kentucky proposal except that it doesn't preface individual with "domestic or
foreign" and doesn't include the phrase "government, governmental agency or sub-
division." Colo. H. B. 1030 § 1(b) (1969).
148 Fourteen states have adopted a substantially similar definition of person
which includes the agents clause. Anrz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521-4 (Supp. May
(Continued on next page)
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The intention here seems to be to prevent evasion of the Act's
prohibitions by denying to a defendant the defense that his agent
or employee had no authority to engage in the behavior objected
to... . Under this definition, the state need only show that the
actor served the defendant in one of the enumerated capacities;
it will not be incumbent upon the state to show that the actor was
operating within his orders from the defendant. This means that
on occasion, a defendant will be held responsible when an
employee in fact exceeded his authority. Given the nature of the
remedies granted by the Act, this will ordinarily not work a hard-
ship on the defendant, but will provide an incentive for sellers to
police their salesmen and copywriters to insure against repeti-
tions. 149
Accordingly, the definition of person would be strengthened by simply
substituting this provision, modified to encompass the Connecticut
innovation. 150 This would then complement the other definitions in
being as broad as presently imaginable to afford the fullest protec-
tive coverage possible to the consumer.
Section 4. Unlawful Practice
(a) The act, use or employment by any person of any deception,
fraud, false pretense, false promise, or misrepresentation in connec-
tion with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or service
is an unlawful practice.
This basic prohibition of consumer fraud is the principal pro-
vision of the Act and is very similar to the best of the three types of
such clauses which other states have adopted.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 261(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IowA
CODE § 713.24(1)(c) (1966); KN. STAT. ANN. § 50-601(C) (Supp. 1968);
MD. CODE ANN. art., § 20(e) (Supp. 1969); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, § 1(a)
(Supp. 1968); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 325.78(3) (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
407.010(3) (Supp. 1968); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(4) (1969); N. M. STAT.
ANN. § 49-15-2A (Supp. 1969); PENN. STAT. tit. 73, § 201-2(2) (Purdon Supp.
V, 1968); R. I. GEN. LAws § 6-13.1-1(a) (Supp. II, 1968); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 5069, § 10.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 1969), as amended, ch. 452, Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. (1969); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.010(1) (Supp. 1967).
149 Travers, supra note 9, at 13.
IG0By combining the language of those fourteen statutes cited at note 148
supra with that of Connecticut and the present proposal, person would be de-
fined as follows:
Person-includes any natural person or his legal representative, any do-
mestic or foreign individual, corporation, government, governmental sub-
division or agency, business, estate, trust, partnership, incorporated or
unincorporated association, two or more of the foregoing having a joint
or common interest, any other legal or commercial entity and any agent,
employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, as-
sociate, trustee, or cestui que trust thereof.
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One alternate version, adopted by five states, may be called a
"Little FTC Act."' 51 It simply employs the central phrase of the FTC's
consumer protective jurisdiction:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of trade or commerce are hereby de-
clared unlawful.
152
Usually appended to this prohibitory clause is a proviso that its
interpretation shall follow FTC administrative rules and case law,15 3
the factor which is considered its strength by its proponents. 54 How-
ever, the fact that it gives both the regulated businessman and the
11 HAWAII REv. STAT. § 480-2 (1968); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, § 2(a)
(Supp. 1968); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 75.1-1 (Supp. VII, 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 2453(a) (Supp. 1969); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (Supp. 1967).
152 The language is from Alternate 1, Section 2 of the legislation forwarded
by the FTC to the Council of State Governments for inclusion in SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION 1970 [hereinafter cited as F.T.C.-S.S.L. 19701 The proposed legisla-
tion was accompanied by an explanatory report [hereinafter cited as F.T.C.-S.S.L.
REP. (1970)]. The materials were released by the FTC on April 23, 1969. The
langage is patterned after the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. §
45 a) 1) (1968). It "is the form preferred by the Federal Trade Commission."
F.T.C.-S.S.L. REP. 1 (1970) (on file, University of Kentucky Law Library).
153The 1967 model specified simply that any actions permitted under laws
administered by any state or federal regulatory body were exempted from cov-
erage. S.S.L. 1967 § 3. Three states have adopted the same or similar language.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-115(f)(1) (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-6
(Supp. 1969); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5069 § 10. 03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1969).
The 1970 model stipulates that it is the legisiative intent that "due consideration
and great weight" be given to the interpretations of the FTC Act by both the
FTC and the federal courts in interpreting the state provision. F.T.C.-S.S.L.
1970 § 3(a). Five states already had the same or similar verbage. N. M. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-15-4 (Supp. 1969); R. I. GEN. LAws tit. 6, § 6-13.1-3 (Supp. II, 1968);
TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 5069, § 10.02(b) (Vernon Supp. 1969). as amended,
ch. 452, Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(b) (Supp.
1969); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.920 (Supp. 1967). Six states exempt any ac-
tivity which is "subject to and complies with' the rules and regulations of the
FTC. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-602 (Supp. 1968); MD. CODE ANN. art. 83, § 21 (Supp. 1969): Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 407.020(1) (Vernon Supp. 1969): N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (Supp.
1969); TEx. REV. Cry. STAT. art. 5069, § 10.03(d), as amended, ch. 452, Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. (1969). Such a rule may be mere surplucage in view of ap-
plicable constitutional principles of federal preemption. See Rice, supra note 19,
at 605; 56 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 26, at 1073-75; 54 IowA L. REv., supra
note 4, at 323. Mas'achusetts, for example, employs roughly the same rule and
specifies procedures for state action in such cases only when the FTC has not acted,
placing the burden for proving the complete defense of compliance upon the
alleged violator. MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 93A, § 3 (Supp. 1968). The most in-
flexible rule is that of Iowa. It does not limit its application only to those ac-
tivities subject to FTC jurisdiction, nor does it establish merely a rule of con-
struction. It patently exempts all trade practices complying with FTC rules, which
simply extend the jurisdiction of the FTC over all commerce in Iowa. d&legating
enforcement as to intrastate commerce to state officials. IOWA CODE § 713.24(12)
(1966).
154 Mindell, supra note 57, at 618-20; Dixon, supra note 20, at 40.
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enforcement agency a sixty-seven volume interpretive manual 5 is
only as meritorious as are the contents of those volumes. It must be
remembered that this rule not only binds state law and intrastate
commerce to federally promulgated administrative and judicial rules,
but, if adopted by every state, would also place every facet of con-
sumer protection in the nation under the policy determinations of an
agency currently receiving extremely critical scrutiny for its failure
to deal vigorously with marketing fraud.156
Furthermore, even were the "Little FTC" prohibitory phrase
adopted without this limitation on construction, it is quite likely that
the courts would nevertheless be guided by the current and past
interpretations given by the FTC and the courts.157 It can be argued
that rather than limiting the state's initiative, this guarantees that
state efforts will not become stymied by the interpretations of an
industry-dominated state enforcement office, for arguably, the agency
more likely to become dominated by those it regulates is the one at
the state level. However, if the state official becomes a pawn of
business, his failure to apply the law will not be deterred by bow it
would be interpreted if it were applied. Moreover, this rationale is
less applicable if the state's enforcement officer is the elected At-
torney General, especially in view of doubts created by recent allega-
tions concerning the FTC.158 Even if the FTC were flawless today,
the very risk that state hands could be tied by federal trade regula-
tions not abreast of the most recent deceptive tactics in the parffular
state is sufficient reason to applaud the rejection of this statutory
approach.
A second alternate version adopted by six states may be called
a "Deceptive Trade Practices Act" since it restrains the "Little FTC"
Act's prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices,"' 59 by de-
fining it as twelve specific practices in terms derived from the Uni-
form Deceptive Trade Practices Act.160 This definition includes the
155 Six volumes, and three supplemental volumes, of court decisions reviewing
FTC orders are available from the Government Printing Office. STATUTES AND
DECIsIONS, FEDERAL TRADE CommissIoN. Decisions of both the Commission and
the courts are indexed in loose-leaf services available from commercial publishers
in a sixty-one volume set. Dixon, supra note 20, at 40.
'
56 See notes 39-49 supra and accompanying text.
157 The New York false advertising statute, though not requiring it, has been
construed according to FTC standards. Mindell, supra note 57, at 617-18.
158 See notes 39-49 supra and accompanying text.
159 S.S.L. 1967 § 2.
160 This promu]gation by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
was designedffor enforcement by the aggrieved individuals. Ulrroam DECEP-
TIvE TADUE PnACrcEs AcT § 3. At the suggestion of the FTC, the Council of
State Governments published the hybrid statute which is the model for the
state laws herein called Deceptive Trade Practices Acts. S.S.L. 1967. Texas uses
(Continued on next page)
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principal standards which had evolved from the FTC Act at the date
it was written.""' Consequently, while the "Little FTC Act" defines
its terms as being the FTC rules and case law at the time it is invoked,
the "Deceptive Trade Practices Act" defines them as only part of
what those standards were in 1967. Accordingly, although the version
of this alternative proposed by the FTC appends one additional
flexibly worded definitional clause,162 even the FTC admits that
the approach is "somewhat narrower in scope"163 than the other two.
The inherent weakness of permitting all consumer frauds not speci-
fied makes this legislation of little avail against the imagination of
the proverbial flim-flam man.
The alternative to which the Kentucky proposal is most similar
can be called a "Consumer Fraud Law." Rather than by being drafted
by a federal agency or national association, it has been adopted by
ten states as simply a paragraph that will fill the gaps in the present
legal structure.16 4 The generality with which the prohibition is phrased
was properly designed "... so that the law would be flexible enough
to cope with novel practices or with variations on old practices, which
sharp operators might invent to eliminate competition unfairly or to
cheat the public." 6 5 The removal of the common law burdens of
(Footnote continued from Preceding page)
this format with the twelve definitional clauses, adding a thirteenth encompassing
fraudulent business-closing sales. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5069, § 10.01(b), as
amended, ch. 452, Tex. Sess. Laws Serv. (1969). Two other states delete the
twelfth clause in the models definitions. One of these appends an additional
clause covering referral sales schemes. PENN. STAT. tit. 73, § 201-2(4) (Purdon
Supp. V, 1968). The other has additional clauses encompassing the fake re-
cruitment of salesmen to solicit customers, bait and switch advertising, failure to
give written copies of installment sales contracts, and flood-damaged goods. Colo.
H.B. 1030 § 2(1) (1969). Still another state statute of this type deletes the
ninth and tenth clauses of the model which relate to bait and switch type ad-
vertising practices. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-112(a) (Supp. 1967). The 1970
version of the model adds the thirteenth clause, which is an attempt to lend this
alternative some elasticity. F.T.C.-S.S.L. 1970 § 2, Alt. 2, (13). Two state
statutes already contained all thirteen clauses. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-2C (Supp.
1969); R. I. GEN. LAws § 6-13.1-1(d) (Supp. II, 1968). The recently amended
Texas statute goes even further in this direction, while retaining the multi-faceted
definition of deceptive practices, by adding the terms false and misleading to its
prohibitory clause and allowing them to remain undefined. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
art. 5069, § 10.02(a), as amended, ch. 452, Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (1969).
161 See Kintner, supra note 13. at 1281-83.
162 F.T.C.-S.S.L. 1970 § 2, Alt. 2. See note 160 supra.
163 F.T.C.-S.S.L. REP. 2 (1970).
164 A=z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522 (Supp. May 1967): ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121-1/2, § 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IowA CODE § 713.24(2)(a) (1966);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-602 (Supp. 1968); MD. CODE. ANN. art. 83 § 21 (Supp.
1969); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 325.79 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.020 (Vernon
Supp. 1969); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (Supp. 1969); N. Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(12)
(McKinney Supp. 1969); N. D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-15-02 (Supp. 1969).
165 Dixon, supra note 20, at 41. The statement was made as to the FTC
language. but. viewed without any strictures on interpretation, is applicable to
both Little FTC Acts and Consumer Fraud Laws.
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proof of reliance and damage' 6 allows the state to act before con-
sumers are defrauded rather than necessitating that someone be
victimized as an element of illegality.
Similarly, the element of scienter is apparently removed,1 67 as it
is from the other two statutory prototypes, 168 on the premise that
the state of mind of the wrongdoers is irrelevant to the question of
whether he should be enjoined from continuing the wrong.169 How-
ever, the draftsmen apparently were of the view that scienter was
retained'" by the phrasing of the "Consumer Fraud" laws of other
states:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud,
false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the conceal-
ment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent
that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission,
in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise,
or service, whether or not any person has been misled, deceived or
damaged thereby, is an unlawful practice. 71 (Emphasis added.)
This is the probable explanation for the deletion from the Kentucky
proposal of the portion emphasized above. However, such a view
overlooks the fact that the placement of the intent requirement is
such that it is applicable only to the practice of "concealment, sup-
pression or omission of a material fact..... It may be, however, that
166 Travers, supra note 9, at 14.
167 Id. at 51 commenting upon the similar Kansas provision. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-602 (Supp. 1968). But see 54 IowA L. REv., supra note 4, at 326 com-
menting upon the Iowa provision which is identical to that of Kansas. IowA
CODE § 7 13.24(2)(a) (1966). The statutes of two states clearly retain the ele-
ment, but are obviously different than those of Kentucky, Kansas or Iowa.
The act, use or employment by any person or any deceptive act or
practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation, ith
the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale or adver-
tisement of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact
been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.... (Emphasis added.) N. D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-15-2 (Supp. 1968).
The Minnesota statute is identical to that of North Dakota except that it
omits the emphasized section. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.79 (1966).1 6 8 FED AL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON DISnRr OF CoLumrA CON-
SUMER PROTECTION PRoGRAm, Attachment, at c (June 1968).
169 "'Whether or not the advertiser knows the representation to be false, the
deception of purchasers and the diversion of trade from competitors is the same.
The purpose of the statute is protection of the public, not punishment of the
wrongdoer." Gimbel Brothers v. F.T.C., 116 F.2d 578, 579 (2nd Cir. 1941).
170 In a memorandum, the Chairman told the Legislative Committee of the
Kentucky Attorney General's Consumer Protection Council, "The first two ele-
ments, misrepresentation and scienter, are retained." Viles, supra note 132, at 4.
The statement is followed by the consumer fraud law language, the phrase "with
intent that others rely" being underscored. This would indicate a reading of the
phrase as if it applied to the deception clause as well as to the concealment
clause. By grammatical structure, this is an unnecessary, if not erroneous, inter-
pretation.
171 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(a) (Supp. 1968).
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the clause was removed so that concealment could be approached
as a "deception" or "misrepresentation" and intent would not be an
element in enjoining the practice. It is undoubtedly true that the
"... factor that most frequently renders an advertisement misleading
is not the character of the statements that it contains, but rather the
information that is omitted." 172 Similarly, to be consistent with the
policy that protective injunctions should not necessitate a showing of
scienter,173 it may be that the intent requirement should be removed
despite the distinguishing factor that concealment is not an overt
deceptive act unless intended. However, it would be unrealistic to
impose a duty to disclose everything a buyer might want to know,
and unnecessary since it is only when a material fact is suppressed
that the practice becomes deceptive.174 Furthermore, the deletion of
the entire clause could render the Act inapplicable to concealment
altogether since it is not unusual for courts to hold that where the
legislature enacts language identical to that of several other states
except for the deletion of a phrase, that action must have been a
calculated rejection of that policy. The Act would, therefore, be
greatly strengthened if either the entire clause were restored or only
the intent phrase were omitted.
A further weakness in the language by which deceptive practices
are proscribed lies in the lack of a specific clause dealing with the
conduct of the seller after the transaction. Manifestly, the lack of
deception prior to or during the sale does not place the consumer
".... beyond the ambit of peril.... Numerous problems may set in
at the performance level. They may range from non-delivery of
merchandise through delivery of substitute goods, delivery of defec-
tive goods, refusal to make repairs or to perform promised serv-
ices....' 7 5 Such practice, especially the more blatant, could probably
be reached under the broad terms of Section 4 (a) of the principal
proposal. However, to remove any questions of application, a specific
clause such as was added to the New Jersey consumer fraud law
would be advisable.176
In addition to the general proscriptive clause, many states append
prohibitions of specific acts.1 7 7 While such enactments are generally
172Barber, supra note 3, at 1208.
173 See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
174 Travers, supra note 9, at 53.
175 Rice, supra note 15, at 563.
176 By amendment, New Jersey added "or with the subsequent performance
of such person as aforesaid" to merchandise and services as items covered. N. J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
177 Illinois has utilized this approach much more extensively than any other
state, incorporating an even dozen such clauses. Included are rules on chain
(Continued on next page)
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beyond the scope of this note, one such provision is vital since it is
"the largest problem in the consumer fraud area." s7 8 This particular
"mask behind which fraud hides"'179 is the Holder-in-Due Course
Doctrine which will
... permit a vendor to sell shoddy or defective goods, which some-
times are not even delivered, coax, wheedle, or coerce the buyer
into signing a negotiable instrument, disappear or dissipate the
funds, and, by assigning the instrument, prevent the deceived or
defrauded consumer from asserting his legitimate defenses in an
action on the note.18 0
It has, therefore, become the lifeblood of the modem film-flar man,
who simply negotiates a contract born of deception to a sales finance
company at a discount' 8 ' and thereby eliminates the consumer's sole
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
referral sales, rescinding peddlers' contracts, returning down payments, holder-
in-due-course, repeated violations of regulatory laws, willful violation of lending
laws, collusive deficiency judgements, collection from spouse or employer, truthtul
credit advertising, motor vehicle warranties. ILL. A.Nm. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 262
A-L (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968). Iowa also includes a provision on chain merch-
andising and contains clauses on going out of business sales and subdividing
realty. Iowa Code § 713.24 (.) (b)-(-d) (1966). Kansas' lone additional pro-
vision p rohibits chain referral sales. KAs. STAT. ANN. § 50-603 (Supp. 1968).
Pennsylvania also specifically incorporates referral sales, PENN. STAT. tit. 73, §§
2.01-2(4) (vii) (Purdon Supp. V, 1968), as well as providing for rescinding con-
tracts made with .door-to-door peddlers. PENN. STT. it. 73, § 201-7 (Purdon
Supp. V, 1968). Vermont's consumer protection act incorporates clauses for re-
scinding contracts for merchandise on grounds of non-delivery, holder-in-due-
course abolition, voiding confessions of judgement, and prohibiting bait and switch
advertising. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2454-2457 (Supp. 1969).
178 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 414.
179 Id. The doctrine was "[dieveloped to promote commerce by assuring
the free flow of commercial instruments . . and in transactions between merch-
ants and commercial enterprises it serves a useful purpose and should be retained.
The reasons for the doctrine do not apply, however, when non-commercial parties
are involved." Comment, Home Improvement Frauds and the Texas Consumer
Credit Code, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 463, 468, 475 (1969).
1
8 0 FEnmuL ThADE ComnMSsioN, supra note 168, at 17. That this is still the
prevailing law in Kentucky was reaffirmed during the last term of the Court of
Appeals in a case where the consumer had, by form contract, waived his de-
fenses and the assignee finance company was held entitled to collect the de-
ficiency after repossession and sale, although the automobile sold for new was
allegedly used. Jennings v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 442 S.W.2d 565 (Ky.
1969). See generally Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The
Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 48 (1966).
181 An investigation by the Texas Consumer Credit Commissioner revealed
that the discounts are usually from 50-80% of the face value of the notes and that
80% or more of the assignees of such notes are sales finance companies. 47
Txx. L. REv., supra note 179, at 467. Some courts are becoming ". .. increas-
ingly reluctant to confer holder in due course status in cases where they find
that the connection of the actual sales transaction is too close or that the assignee
has knowledge or should have known of the dealer's misconduct." FxvmxAL
ThADE Comissiox, supra note 168, at 17, citing Norman v. Worldwide Distrib.
Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963). The practicality of this approach
as a solution to the misuse of the doctrine is faulty on several grounds. First, it is
(Continued on next page)
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lever for extracting performance of his promises. Nevertheless, the
consumer must pay the assignee in full despite faulty goods or even
complete non-performance.
Of the three primary statutory approaches to this problem, the
clearly preferable alternative is simply to make the assignee subject
to all the claims and defenses the consumer had against the seller.
182
An alternative proposed in the Uniform Commercial Credit Code
(UCCC) 1 83 and adopted by several states'84 allows the consumer a
brief period subsequent to his notification of the assignment in which
to preserve all his claims by notice to the assignee. Such a provision
. . . [is deemed clearly unacceptable because it is unrealistic to
expect low-income consumers or others not versed in the law to
be apprised of their rights under the law and to defend themselves
against the holder-in-due-course doctrine.' 8 5
Neither is this approach remedied by requiring notice to the consumer
of his right to press the claims during the specified period and of the
consequences for failure to do so, s18 since "the roof never leaks before
this time has been long gone anyway"' 1 7 A second alternative pro-
posed by the UCCC would limit the validity of the consumer's claims
to defenses in an action by the assignee. 88
This would allow continuation of threats to and impairment of
a consumer's credit rating which result from harassing collection
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
"... dulled by ignorance of the law on the part of attorneys . . . 'you can count
the ones that know about the Norman case on your fingers."' 114 U. PA. L. REv.,
supra note 19, at 416 (quoting an attorney for a finance company). Second, Ken-
tucky has yet to adopt the Norman rationale. Third, were Kentucky to adopt the
rule and all lawyers made aware of it, the consumer would still have the dif-
ficult and expensive burden of proving knowledge except where the assignee s
involvement is obvious. And finally such precedental developments are unlikely
since lending institutions, aware of the judicial trend, are eager to settle legal
difficulties with the few consumers represented by counsel with similar aware-
ness. 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 416.
18
2 See MD. ANN. C45 art. 83, § 147 (1957); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 255,
§ 12(c) (1961); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615(G) (1965) (motor vehicle sales
and revolving charge accounts); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1969);
F.T.C.-S.S.L. 1970 § 9.18 3 
UNWORmv! CommmcIAL CaaErr CODE § 2.404 Alt. B.
18 4 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4312 (Supp. 1968); HAW Ai REv. STAT. §
476-18 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 262 D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968);
N. Y. PEas. Piop. LAw § 403 (1), (3) (McKinney 1962); PENN. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73, § 500-207, 208 (Supp. 1967) (home improvement); TEx REv. CIv. STAT.
ch. 5069, § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1969).
185 F.T.C.-S.S.L. REP., 5 (1970).
18 6 See e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/, § 262 D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
187 114 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 19, at 417 (quoting an attorney for a
finance company).
18 8 UNI onm CoMa2xacrmL CnEnrr CODE § 2.404 Alt. A. Apparently Cali-




tactics sometimes used without any actual litigation being under-
taken against the consumer1 8 9
Thus, the only adequate method for dealing with this tool of the
unscrupulous is simply to terminate its operation as to consumer
paper.
The obvious result of the abolition of this doctrine will be that
the bulk of the burden of investigating the dealer's reliability will fall
upon the financing institution. This is an advantageous approach not
only because the finance company is better able to ferret out the
fraudulent, but also because it can require a repurchase agreement
for possible buyer defaults. 90 A resulting reduction in the prevalence
of perpetually fraudulent business concerns will be inevitable. It is
hardly a detrimental possibility that the resulting investigation costs
would be passed on to the credit consumer, since he is already paying
the bill for the deceptions financed by the holders-in-due course.
Similarly, the spurious nature of the argument of the financial com-
munity that the cost of such a law would "destroy the credit boom"
is belied by the nonexistence of such an occurrence in those states
having such laws.191 Apparently, the only severe harm is incurred by
those marginal financing agencies who do not check their dealers and
are, therefore, the best allies of the "blue suede boys." 92
In sum, the Kentucky proposal is adequate to remove the present
legal barriers to reaching deceptive practices and, therefore, is an
extremely important development in protecting the Kentucky con-
sumer. However, its exclusion of language expressly covering decep-
tion by concealment, its failure to include a phrase explicitly covering
the subsequent performance of the seller, and its failures to deal with
the financial lifeblood 9 3 of consumer frauds, the holder-in-due-course
189 F.T.C.-S.S.L. REPI. 5 (1970).
190 114 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 19, at 417-18.
191 See note 182 supra.
192 114 U. PA. L. Rxv., supra note 19, at 418.
'93 Arguably, another shortcoming of this proposed statute is the failure to
empower the Attorney General to issue rules and regulations interpreting the pro-
hibitory language of Section 4(a). See, e.g., F.T.C.-S.S.L. 1970§3(b). Such a
provision is hepfl to adequately inform the businessman who wishes 
to comply.
It removes the excuse of confusion from the one who doesn't. While it is true
that the Attorney General may be able to partially accomplish this by advisory
opinions and public pronouncements, neither can be tested short of conduct which
vio]ates the statute if the agency's view is upheld. Spanogle, supra note 15, at
629-30. For the businessman conscious of consumer good will" an alternative
short of "deliberately violating the statute" would be much preferred. Id. By this
rationale, the grant of power to the Attorney General to issue interpretative regu-
lations would be clearly preferable. However, if such a provision were used
extensively, it could keep the Attorney General's limited staff in court litigating
its rules, leaving no time for enforcing them. Conversely, if it were utilized in-
frequently, the purposes and expectations underlying its provision would be un-
(Continued on next page)
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doctrine, leave the proposal short of adequately remedying the plight
of the consumer. 94
Section 4. Unlawful Practice
(a) . . . .
(b) Section 4 (a) of this Act shall not apply-to the owner or
publisher of newspapers, magazines or publications wherein such
advertising appears, or to the owner or operator of a radio or
television station which disseminates such advertisement when
the owner, publisher or operator has no knowledge that such ad-
vertisement may be in violation of Section 4 (a) of this Act.
Section 5. Function of Other Agencies Not
Impaired or Limited
(a) This Act shall not be construed to impair or limit the func-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
fulfilled. Furthermore, a primary purpose for putting supervision of the statute in
the Office of the Attorney General is that its enforcement should be by the "public
legal counsel" rather than an agency with regulatory powers and duties. The
power to make interpretative rules is the power to daily supervise industry with-
out the necessary expertise as well as the power to mollify the rigor of the law
with all its attendant inducements. See notes 54-62 supra and accompanying text.
19 4 By restoring the concealment clause of the typical consumer fraud law
without restoring the intent requirement usually appended thereto (see notes
169-71 supra and accompanying text) and by ading the New Jersey method of
including the seller's performance (see note 176 supra), as well as eradicating the
holder in due course problems by making the consumer's defenses applicable to
the assignee (see notes 172-84 supra and accompanying text), this portion of the
Kentucky proposal would read as follows:
4(a) The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud,
false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation or the concealment,
suppression or omission of a material fact, in connection with the sale
or advertisement of any merchandise or service or with the subsequent
performance of such person aforesaid, is an unlawful practice.
4(c) If any contract for sale of consumer goods or services on credit
entered into between a retail seller and a retail buyer requires or in-
volves the execution of a promissory note or instrument or other evi-
dence of indebtedness such note, instrument or evidence of indebted-
ness shall have printed on the face thereof the words "consumer paper
and such note, instrument or evidence of indebtedness with the words
"consumer paper" printed thereon shall not be a negotiable instrument
within the meaning of K.R.S. § 355.3 and the subdivisions thereof
[Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper]. [F.T.C.-S.S.L. 1970 §
9(a).]
4(d). Notwithstanding the absence of such notice on a note, instru-
ment or evidence of indebtedness arising out of a sale, an assignee of
the rights of the seller is subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer
against the seller arising out of the sale. Any agreement to the con-
trary shall be of no force or effect in limiting the rights of a consumer
under this Section. Failure to imprint the words "consumer paper" on
such note, instrument or evidence of indebtedness shall be deemed a
deceptive practice within the meaning of subsection (a) of this Section.
[See F.T.C.-S.S.L. 1970 § 9(b).]
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tioning of other agencies of this Commonwealth with jurisdiction
over matters covered by this Act.
(b) The Attorney General shall cooperate with any govern-
mental agency of the Commonwealth which has statewide licensing
jurisdiction over a subject matter covered by this Act to avoid
duplication of investigation or remedial action.
The exemption for the media created by Section 4 (b) has be-
come a somewhat standard clause in consumer protection legisla-
tion. 95 Although applicable constitutional principles would make
harassment of the press nevertheless preventable,9 ( this provision
is a useful safeguard for avoiding the problem altogether. Its provi-
sions, however, extend beyond practical or constitutional necessity.
By the present wording, if the advertisement were on behalf of the
medium itself, or written for someone by an agent of the medium,'07
or, perhaps, prepared on behalf of another business interest of the
medium's owner, a showing of knowledge of the deception would
apparently be required to overcome the exemption. 198 Furthermore,
the knowledge requirement being a subjective standard, it not only
eliminates any reason for the press to investigate advertisements which
appear to be deceptive, but actually discourages any such endeavor
which might confer the necessary knowledge. 199 While any duty
extending beyond those messages the publisher should have known
were deceptive might be an excessive burden,200 the investigative
costs can certainly be more easily borne by those who profit from
the enterprise than by shifting it to the taxpayers as the state budget
for consumer protection or to the consumer as the cost of successful
frauds. Section 4(b) should, therefore, be rephrased so that any
advertisement for the media, or prepared by its agents, or which
195 The consumer protection laws of at least fourteen states include such a
clause. ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1523 (Supp. May 1967); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-115 (f)(2) (Supp. 1967); HAWAIx REV. STAT. § 480-2 (1968); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IowA CoDE § 713.24 (12)
(1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-602 (Supp. 1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83,
§ 21 (Supp. 1969); MnN. STAT. ANN. § 325.79 (2) (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 407.020 (1) (Vernon Supp. 1969); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (Supp. 1969);
N. M. STAT. AN. § 49-15-14 (Supp. 1969); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5069, §
10.03(h) (Vernon Supp. 1969), as amended, ch. 452, Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
(1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2452 (Supp. 1969); Colo. H. B. 1030 § 3(1) (c)
(1969).196 See e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 28s U.S. 697 (1931).
197 While it could be plausibly argued that in writing the advertisement, the
individual would acquire knowledge of the potential deception, the standard is
subjective and therefore not necessarily satisfied.
198 F.T.C.-S.S.L. REP. 3 (1970).
199 See Travers, supra note 9, at 53.
200 Id.; 54 IowA L. REV., supra note 4, at 336.
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should have been known to be deceptive, is not exempted from the
coverage of the act.
20 1
In contrast to the exception for the press, Section 5 is an astutely
fashioned provision that neither the Attoyney General nor any other
state agency can nullify or duplicate the authority of the other, but
that the Attorney General may assert his jurisdiction when a regu-
latory body fails to act.20 2 This section also avoids the weakness per-
mitted by some states of exempting anything in compliance with
the regulations of the FTC, which is simply a backdoor method of
delegating interpretation of the state law to the federal agency and
courts and thereby making the Attorney General's staff part of the
FTC enforcement mechanism.203 Section 5, therefore, is quite ex-
emplary.
Section 6. Investigation
(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that a
person has engaged in, or is engaging in, any practice declared by
this Act to be unlawful, and when he believes it to be in the public
interest, he may conduct an investigation to ascertain whether a
201 Borrowing from the FTC proposal to incorporate the additions herein-
above suggested, [F.T.C.-S.S.L. 1970 § 4(b)] the exclusion for the media would
read as follows:
4(b). Section 4(a) of this act shall not apply-to the owner or publisher
of newspapers, magazines or publications wherein such advertising ap-
pears, or to the owner or operator of a radio or television station which
disseminates such advertisement-except when the owner, publisher or
operator or agent, employee salesman or officer thereof has prepared the
advertisement, or has or should have knowledge that such advertise-
ment may be in violation of Section 4(a) of this Act or the owner, pub-
lisher or operator has a financial interest in the sale or distribution ofthe advertised merchandise or service. (Additions emphasized.)
2021In view of limitations on budget and staff, the Attorney General could
hardly desire or be able to utilize this power except in cases of severe derelic-
tion of duty by the agency, precisely the cases in which such power is needed.
Otherwise, the Department of Law can be expected to rely on such agencies
for cooperative assistance to ease its own workload. Many state statutes are simply
silent on this subject; which may or may not enable the consumer counsel to
intervene when necessary. On the other hand, some states flatly exempt certain
state agencies. While inferring that those not mentioned are within the ambit of
the law, such an approach grants to those named an immunity from being prodded
to better protect the consumer. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.020(2) (Vernon Supp.
1969) (Supt. Savings & Loan, Comm's Insurance and Finance); TEx REzv. Crv.
STAT. art. 5069, § 10.02(e) (Vernon Supp. 1969) (insurance). However, even
that is better than flatly exempting anything subject to a state regulatory board on
the excuse that the extent of duplication makes enumeration too cumbersome.
Conceivably, this approach even exempts such agencies as "barber and beau-
tician" type boards whose concern for protection relates to the trade rather than
to the consumers. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, 3(a) (Supp. 1968); N. M. STAT.
ANN. § 6-13.1-4 (Supp. II, 1968); Tix. REv. Civ. STATS. art. 5069, § 10.02(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1969).
203 See notes 153-58 supra and accompanying text. But see Travers, supra
note 9, at 54.
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person in fact has engaged in, or is engaging in, any practice de-
clared by this Act to be unlawful.
(b) To accomplish the purposes of Section 6a of the Act,
the Attorney General shall first seek voluntary cooperation of
persons. If the Attorney General has probable cause to believe
that a violation has occurred, he may thereafter apply to a circuit
court having jurisdiction or the Franklin County Circuit Court for
permission to issue subpoenas duces tecum and/or ad testificatum to
any person, and administer an oath or affirmation to any person,
require any such person to file, on such forms as the Attorney Gen-
eral prescribes, a statement or a report in writing under oath or
otherwise as to the facts and circumstances concerning the trans-
action or transactions in question, and such other data and infor-
mation as he may deem necessary, or conduct hearings in aid of
any investigation or inquiry. Such motion shall state in writing
the grounds which the Attorney General believes constitute prob-
able cause.
Upon refusal by any person to comply with a subpoena as set
out in this Act, provide an oath or affirmation, or cooperate in hear-
ings in aid of any investigation or inquiry, the Attorney General
may apply to a circuit court in the Commonwealth of Kentucky
for an order of contempt, and such circuit court shall issue an
appropriate order if it finds that to do so is in the public interest.
(c) Whenever the Attorney General has probable cause to be-
lieve that information will not be obtainable pursuant to Section
6 (b) during the course of any investigation, he may apply to a
circuit court ex parte for an order impounding any record, book,
document, account, paper or sample of merchandise, material to
such practice under investigation. Such motion shall state in writing
the grounds which the Attorney General believes constitute prob-
able cause.
The circuit court shall specify by order the length of time for
copy or inspection.
Section 7.
Any book, record, paper, memorandum or other documentary
information produced by any person pursuant to the Act, or any
copy thereof, shall not, unless otherwise ordered by a court of this
Commonwealth for good cause shown, be disclosed to any person
other than the Attorney General or his authorized agent or repre-
sentative or other governmental agency, unless the consent of the
person producing the same is obtained, or such documentary in-
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formation is filed as a matter of record in the circuit court having
jurisdiction in the action.
Section 8.
Any person may apply to a circuit court for an appropriate
order to protect such person from any unreasonable investigative
action pursuant to this Act.
Section 9. Service of the Subpoena
To the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United
States, service of a subpoena or demand pursuant to Section 6 of
this Act may be had in the manner prescribed by the Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 10. Destruction or Falsification of Evidence
(a) Any person with actual notice that an investigation has be-
gun or is about to begin pursuant to Section 6 of this Act who
intentionally conceals, alters, destroys or falsifies documentary ma-
terial is subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor
more than five thousand dollars.
(b) Any person who in response to a subpoena or demand as
provided in Section 6 of this Act who intentionally falsifies or with,
holds documents, records, or pertinent materials that are not priv-
ileged, is subject to a fine as provided in Section 10 (a) of this Act.
Allowing the Attorney General broad investigatory power is a
necessary step in obtaining effective and meaningful consumer pro-
tection. If such power is not granted, either the businessman or the
consumer or both can be harmed by the results, for the Attorney
General then has only four options in protecting the consumer from
the uncooperative suspect: (1) he can cease pursuing those schemes
whose violation of the law is most difficult to prove, thereby allowing
even more citizens to be defrauded; (2) he can bring court action
with insufficient evidence and risk not only failing his burden of
proof but also injuring the reputation of an innocent corporation;
(3) he can allow the fraudulent company to continue to deceive
and damage its customers while his staff diligently pieces together the
necessary proof from the victims after they have been harmed; or
(4) he can appropriate the bulk of his budget to hiring investigators
even though the money comes from the same people being de-
frauded by those under investigation, the public. The necessity of
permitting power of investigation is, therefore, clear.
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Understandably, the business community may be reluctant to
support a proposal which is potentially a tool of harassment. However,
the Kentucky proposal is drafted to eliminate such a possibility.
First, Section 6 (b) requires the Attorney General to seek voluntary
cooperation of the businessman before petitioning the court for a
subpoena. This recognizes that the honest businessman is always pre-
pared to cooperate with the investigation for the same reason he
will give a refund for the wrong size shirt-he is in business for re-
turn business. Secondly, the provisions of Section 8 of the proposal
protect the party being investigated from an unreasonable search2 4
by permitting a court order relieving the movant therefrom. It has
been held under a statute similar to this proposal that a subpoena
duces tecum was an unreasonable search if it called for documents
that are utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry or if its futility to
uncover anything legitimate is inevitable.20 5 Therefore, these sections
protect the businessman from pure harassment by the state while not
unduly limiting the scope of the investigation.
However, other sections of the proposal are so strict in limiting
the power of investigation that protection of the consumer is simi-
larly limited. Section 6 permits the Attorney General to conduct an
investigation if he believes someone has engaged in, or is engaging
in a violation of the Act. This is sufficient as far as it goes, but the
more realistic approach adopted by many states allows him to in-
vestigate if he believes that someone is about to engage in a violation
of the Act,206 thereby allowing the state to nip the scheme in the bud
instead of having to wait until the consumer has been injured.
Similarly, only if the Attorney General can show probable cause
would the proposal allow him, in the absence of voluntary cooper-
ation, to apply to a circuit court for permission to issue a sub-
poena, administer an oath, require a statement, or conduct a hearing
in aid of any investigation. This is more extensive investigatory power
than that of many state laws which are limited to the production of
documentary material relevant to the investigation, excluding oaths,
2 04 The provisions of several state statutes are similar:
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 6, § 2517 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.040
(Vernon Supp. 1969); R. I. GEN. LAws tit. 6, § 6-13.1-7g (Supp. II, 1968);
WAsH. RE;v. CoD. § 19.86.110(4) (Supp. 1967).
205 La Belle Creole International, S.A. v. Attorney General, 10 N.Y.2d 192,
176 N.E.2d 705, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961).2 0 6
ILL. ANN. STAT. chi. 121-1/2, § 263 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IOWVA
CODE, § 173.24 (1966); KAN STAT. ANN. § 50-604 (Supp. 1968); N. J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-3, as amended, (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CoDE ANN. 51-15-04
(Supp. 1969).
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statements, and hearings. 207 However, the requirements that the At-
torney General have probable cause and that he apply to the court
definitely make the Kentucky proposal weaker and more restrictive
than many state laws which allow the Attorney General to issue an
administrative subpoena without applying to the court.208 An admin-
istrative subpoena may be issued on mere suspicion, while a court
subpoena generally can issue only in a case or controversy or upon
a showing of probable cause.20 9 Thus, the alteration of this section
to substitute administrative for judicial orders is necessary to allow
a more realistic standard of proof for the undertaking of a civil in-
vestigation. Furthermore, the purpose of a hearing being to explore
potential areas of concern, the requirement of a court order upon
probable cause shown must be eliminated for this mechanism to have
any utility at all. These alterations would create the wider scope of
investigation needed to protect the consumers from flim-flar men,
while the retention of Sections 6 (b) and 8 would still allow judicial
intervention to thwart any harassing administrative tactics.
In fact, the provisions of Section 7 would keep the administrative
investigation confidential, whereas the necessary court proceedings
in the present proposal will entail public records which could result in
damaging the reputation of an innocent firm. Section 7 states that in-
formation produced by a person pursuant to the Act cannot be dis-
closed to anyone other than representatives of governmental agencies
except by court order for good cause shown or by consent of the person
producing the information. Several states have non-disclosure clauses
like the Kentucky proposal,210 but others specifically state that any
information obtained by the Attorney General pursuant to the Act
cannot be used in any criminal prosecution.211 The latter would seem
to be the best idea for it avoids the possibility of using any fifth
amendment self-incrimination arguments to quash the subpoena. How-
207 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2514 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.040
(Vernon Supp. 1969); R. I. GEN. LAws tit. 6, § 6-13.1-7a (Supp. H, 1968);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2460(a) (Supp. 1968); WA.sH. REv. CODE § 19.86.110(1)
(Supp. 1967).208 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-112 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2,
§ 264 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IowA CODE § 713.24 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-605 (Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-3, as amended, (Supp. 1969);
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63(12) (MeKinney Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 9
51-15-05 (Supp. 1969).
209 Comment, 50 CAL. L. REv. 532, 533, (1962), citing United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).2 ' 0 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.060 (Vernon Supp. 1969); R.I., GEN. LAws tit.
6, 6-13-1-7f (Supp. 1I, 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 9, § 2460(a) (Supp. 1969);
WAsH. BEv. CODE § 19.86.110(6) (Supp. 1967).
211 IowA CODE § 713.24 (1966).
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ever, such a limitation should be drafted to insure that the Attorney
General is not prevented from informing a local prosecutor of the
existence of a violation of the penal laws and that the prosecutor is
not prevented from using such evidence as he may obtain by his own
investigation.
The weakest portion of the proposals investigation section lies
in the extent to which the sanction for refusal to comply with an
order can be applied to a corporation whose business affairs are
arranged so that it is technically "not doing business in the state."
Section 9, obviously designed for this problem, provides that a sub-
poena issued pursuant to Section 6 of the Act shall be valid to the
fullest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States.
This provision is defective in two major respects.
First, this section also provides that the subpoena shall be served
in the manner prescribed by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure,
which means that the only valid manner of service within or without
the Commonwealth will be personal service as provided for in Rule
45.03 of the Kentucky Rules.212 It would seem that a more feasible
solution would be to specify the permissible manner of service in the
statute itself as has been done by most other states.213 If the statute
were so worded, it could permit service by registered mail to the last
known place of business, residence, or abode within or without the
state of the person for whom the subpoena was intended,214 and
would not be bound by the limitations of Rule 45.03.
The second, and much more serious, weakness is that the whole
of Section 9 is defeated by the failure to provide a sanction other than
civil contempt for refusal to comply with investigative orders. The
language of Section 9 has utility in insuring that the state can
effectively serve a subpoena upon the corporation "not doing busi-
ness" in the Commonwealth. This would incorporate the rule of the
2 12 "A subpoena may be served by an officer by whom a summons might be
served. It may also be served by any person over eighteen years of age, and his
affidavit indorsed thereon shall be proof of service or the witnesses may ac-
knowledge service in writing on the subpoena. Service of the subpoena shall be
made by delivering or offering to deliver a copy thereof to the person to whom
it is directed." Ky. R. Crv. P. 45.03.
213 DE . CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2519 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2,
§ 265 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE § 713.24(5) (1966); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-606 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.040 (Vernon Supp. 1969);
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-5, as amended, (Supp. 1969); R. I. GEN. LAws tit. 6, §
6.13.1-7d (Supp. II, 1968); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.110(4) (Supp. 1967).
214 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2519 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 12-1/2,
§ 265 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IowA CODE § 713.24(5) (1966); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-606 (Supp. 1968); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-5. as amended, (Supp.
1969): R.I. GEN. LAws tit. 6, § 6-13.1-7d (Supp. II, 1968); WASHa. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.110(4) (Supp. 1967).
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leading case, La Belle Creole International, S.A. v. Attorney-General,15
which held "that not even the minimum contacts and fair play test of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,216 which must be met to support
a personal judgment, are necessary for the service of a subpoena"21
7
issued by an Attorney General pursuant to such a state statute. How-
ever, if the out-of-state corporation did not fall within the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the "minimum contacts test" the court would
not have jurisdiction to grant an order of contempt as a sanction for
failing to respond to a subpoena because the monetary penalty of a
contempt citation, being analogous to a personal judgment, requires
the "minimum contacts" for its imposition against a foreign corpora-
tion.218 Thus, unless additional sanctions which can be imposed upon
the corporation not "doing business" are incorporated, Section 9 will
be totally ineffective despite the cunning of its draftsmanship.
The more effective statutes that provide sanctions for refusal to
comply with an investigative order permit the Attorney General to
apply to the court for an order enjoining the sale or advertisement
of any merchandise by the person in the state, or dissolving a domestic
corporation or suspending the certificate of authority to do business
in the state of a foreign corporation.21 9 The "minimum contacts test"
would be inapplicable to this sanction because it is inherent within
a state's powers to refuse to permit a foreign corporation to do business
within its borders.220 Accordingly, if Section 9 is to have any utility,
such a provision must be appended to the proposal.
A similar problem arises because the Kentucky proposal, as does
no other consumer law in the nation, requires the Attorney General,
as his first step in combating fraud, to seek voluntary cooperation
of the suspect. This seems rather noble but self-defeating in that it
would give a disreputable merchant ample time to destroy evidence.
Of course, the Kentucky proposal, like several other state statutes,
allows the Attorney General to obtain an order from the court im-
pounding records, books, documents or other materials to prevent
the destruction of evidence. 21 The requirement of first seeking co-
215 10 N.Y.2d 192, 176 N.E.2d 705, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961).
216326 U.S. 310 (1945).
217 50 CAL. L. REv., supra note 209, at 534.
218 Id. at 534-35.
21) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2520 (SUPP. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. cli. 121-1/2,
§ 266 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IowA CODE § 713.24(6) (1966); KANi. STAT.
ANN. § 50-607 (Supp. 1968); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-6, as amended, (Supp.
1969); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-15-06 (Supp. 1969).
22050 CAL. L. REV., supra note 209, at 534 and cases cited therein.
221 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2518 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121-1/2, § 263 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969): KAN. STAT. ANx. § 50-604 (Supp.
1968); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-3, as amended, (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. 9 51-15-04 (Supp. 1969).
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operation, however, would still provide the requisite time if the
penalty is not a sufficient deterrent. Section 10 does fine anyone having
actual notice of the investigation who destroys pertinent evidence.
Although this provision would seem to be an effective sanction, and
has been adopted by several states, 222 it faces the same jurisdictional
test as the monetary contempt judgment.223 Thus, the power to seek
disfranchisement of a foreign corporation should be applicable to
destruction and concealment of evidence as well as to the complete
refusal to comply.
In sum, then, while the proposal recognizes the necessity of in-
vestigative powers to the effective protection of the consuming public,
it fails to provide the scope of investigation required for the task.
Both permission to investigate potential as well as past deceptive
practices and the adoption of administrative rather than judicial
investigative orders are necessary amendments. Also worthy of adop-
tion is a prohibition on the admission of evidence gained therefrom
into a criminal proceeding without impairing the Attorney General's
duty to inform a prosecutor of any criminal acts coming to his at-
tention. And most importantly, the addition of injunction and busi-
ness ouster for refusal to comply with investigative demands and for
destruction and concealment of evidence is absolutely essential to
make these investigatory powers effectively applicable to the worst
of the "blue suede boys," those corporations willfully engaging in
deceptive practices via the guise of independent contractors. While
all these alterations would be beneficial to the consumer, none would
be detrimental to the honest businessman due to those provisions
wisely incorporated into the original proposal keeping all investiga-
tions within the judicial standards of reasonableness. 224
222 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.080 (Vernon Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAws tit. 6,
§ 6-13.1-7h (Supp. 1H, 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2460(b) (Supp. 1969);
WAsHE. REv. CODE § 19.86.110(8) (Supp. 1967).
223 See note 218 supra, and accompanying text.
224The investigatory sections of the Kentucky proposal, §§ 6-10, could be
improved by modifying them to incorporate §§ 11(a), 12-14 of the model Con-
sumer Protection Act. CoUNCmL OF STATE CovR ivm-r, SuccESTsD STATE LEMGs-
LAT N 1970, at 141. Section 8 can remain the same. However, for §§ 6(a)-(b)
of the Kentuckyproposal there should be substituted § 11(a) and the first four
lines of § 12 of the model proposal. CouNciL OF STATE GovoEs , supra at
150-15. § 6(c) of the Kentucky proposal should be revised to reflect that the
probable cause requirement apples to issuance by the court, not aplication by
the state. Furthermore, §§ 7, 9-10 of the Kentucky proposal shouldbe modified
as hereafter shown.
Section 6.
(a). When it appears to the Attorney Ceneral that a person has en-
gaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in any act or practice
declared to be unlawful by this Act, or when he believes it to be in the
public interest that an investigation should be made to ascertain whether
(Continued on next page)
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Section 11. Affidavits of Discontinuance
At any time prior to the institution of a suit against a person
for violation of Section 4 of this Act, the Attorney General may
accept an Affidavit of Discontinuance from any person who is
alleged to have engaged in an activity declared by this Act to be
unlawful, providing for the immediate discontinuance of all prac-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
a person in fact has engaged in, is engaging in or is about to engage
in, any act or practice declared to be unlawful by this Act, he may
execute in writing and cause to be served upon any person who is be-
lieved to have information, documentary material or physical evidence
relevant to the alleged or suspected violation, an investigative demand
requiring such person to furnish, under oath or otherwise, a report in
writing setting forth the relevant facts and circumstances of which he
has knowledge, or to appear and testify or to produce relevant docu-
mentary material or physical evidence for examination, at such reason-
able time and place as may be stated in the investigative demand, con-
cerning the advertisement, sale or offering for sale of any goods or
services or the conduct of any, trade or commerce that is the subject
matter of the investigation. lid., at 150.]
(b). To accomplish the objectives and to carry out the duties pre-
scribed by this Act; the Attorney General. in addition to the other
powers conferred upon him by this Act; may issue subpoenas to any
person, administer an oath or affirmation to any person, and conduct
hearings in aid of any investigation or inquiry. [Compare id., at 151.]
(c). Upon showing of probable cause to believe that information will not
be obtainable pursuant to Section 6(a) or Section 6(c) during the course
of any investigation, a circuit court may grant an application ex parte
by the Attorney General for an order impounding any record, book,
document, account paper or sample of merchandise, material to such
practice under investigation. Such a motion shall state in writing the
grounds which the Attorney General believes constitute probable cause.
The Circuit Court shall specify by order the length of time for copy
or inspection. (Alterations emphasized.)
Section 7.
Any book, record, paper, memorandum or other documentary infor-
mation produced by any person pursuant to this Act, or any copy thereof,
shall not, unless otherwise ordered by a court of this Commonwealth for
good cause shown, be disclosed to any person other than the Attorney
General or his authorized agent or representative or other governmental
agency, unless the consent of the person producing the same is ob-
tained, or such documentary information is filed as a matter of record
in the Circuit Court having jurisdiction in the action. No information
obtained pursuant to this Act shall be used in a criminal prosecution,
provided that this shall not be construed to prevent the Attorney Gen-
eral or his agent from informing any Commonwealth or County Attorney
of the existence of a crime nor to prevent said Commonwealth or Countu
Attorney from using the same or similar matters if otherwise obtained.
(Alterations emphasized.)
Section 9. Service of Subpoena
Service of subpoena or demand pursuant to Section 6 of this Act
may be had to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution of the
United States.
Service of any notice, demand or subpoena under this Act shall be
made personally within this State, but if such cannot be obtained, sub-
stituted service therefore may be made in the following manner:
(1) Personal service thereof without this State; or
(Continued on next page)
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tices set forth in the Affidavit, and for such other action deemed
necessary to correct the results of such practices. No proceeding
shall be instituted thereafter by the Attorney General on the
specific activities covered by such Affidavit, unless the provisions
contained in the Affidavit appear to have been violated.
In specifically authorizing the use of affidavits of discontinuance,
the proposal insures that the Attorney General will have this ex-
tremely useful method of protecting the consumer through the volun-
tary compliance of the seller.22 5 The exigencies of time, money and
personnel will require the disposition of the majority of the cases by
informal agreement if the Act is to have a pervasive effect.226 At the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(2) The mailing thereof by registered or certified mail to the last
known place of business, residence or abode within or without this State
of such person for whom the same is intended; or
v,(3) As to any person other than a natural person, in the manner pro-
dedin the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure as if a complaint ad
been filed- or
(4) Such service as a circuit court may direct in lieu of personal service.
[Compare id., at 151.]
Section 10.
If any person fails or refuses to file any statement or report, or obey
any subpoena or investigative demand issued by the Attorney General,
or with actual notice that an investigation has begun or is about to begin
pursuant to Section 6 of this Act intentionally conceals, alters, destroys,
falsifies or withholds documentary material, the Attorney General may,
after notice, apply to a circuit court and, after hearing thereon, request
an order:
(1) Granting injunctive relief to restrain the person from engaging in
the advertising or sale of any merchandise or the conduct of any trade
or commerce that is involved in the alleged or suspected violation;
(2) Vacating, annulling, or suspending the corporate charter of a
corporation created by or under the laws of this State or revoking or
suspending the certificate of authority to do business in this State of a
foreign corporation or revoking or suspending any other licenses, per-
mits or certificates issued pursuant to law to such person which are
used to further the allegedly unlawful practice; and
(3) Granting such other relief as may be required, until the person
files the statement or report, or obeys the subpoena or investigative
demand. Any disobedience of any final order entered under this Sec-
tion by any court shall be punished as a contempt thereof. [Compare id.,
at 151-52.1
225 The proposed affidavit of discontinuance is another appellation for cease
and desist agreements, assurance of discontinuance, etc. With a variety of names,
at least thirteen states have included this tool in their consumer protection laws.
Others may have such power by another statute or even without one. Aiuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1530 (Supp. May 1967); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-112
(Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2521 (Supp. 1968); HAwAn REV. STAT.
§ 480-22 (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-610 (Supp. 1968); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 93A, § 5 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.030 (Vernon Supp. 1969);
N. Y. EXEc. LAw § 63 § McKinney Supp. 1969); R. I. GEN. LAws § 6-13.1-6
(Supp. II, 1968); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5069, § 10.05, as amended, ch. 452,
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2459 (Supp. 1969); WAsH.
REV. CODE § 19.86.100 (Supp. 1967); Colo. H.B. 1030 § 7 (2) (1969).226 See Mindell, supra note 57.
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same time, the persuasive presence of the state in the mediation process
is further enhanced by the authority to make the agreement binding
and enforceable by the state. Furthermore, the relative lack of ex-
pense and publicity are inducements to the businessman to act co-
operatively. 22 7 While negotiation is an expedient and useful tool, if
it is to be an adequate enforcement mechanism the agency must
be able to act fairly in attempts to resolve every issue relevant to
the public while it is negotiating the consent agreement. 228 Thus, it
should be able to decide whether the relative clarity of the violation
necessitates that the violator be required to admit it.229 It should also
be empowered to negotiate whether to require reimbursement of both
defrauded consumers for their damages and the agency for its in-
vestigative expenses.230 By skillfully affording this flexibility rather
than making such alternatives either mandatory or prohibited, the
language of Section 11 clearly shows superiority in both policy
determination and draftsmanship.
Section 12.
(a) The Attorney General may enforce the provisions of Section
4 of this Act by civil action for injunctive relief in a circuit court
of this Commonwealth. In such action to obtain said injunction, it
shall be sufficient to allege and prove that a violation of this Act
has occurred, and it shall not be necessary to allege or prove that
any person has been misled or deceived thereby, or that any person
227 Rice, supra note 15, at 589. Many corresponding clauses of other state
statutes provide that the agreement "shall not be considered a violation for any
purpose. See e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.030 (Vernon Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6-13.1-6 (Supp. 11, 1968); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 5069, § 10.05
(Vernon Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2459 (Supp. 1969). This provides
a further inducement to the businessman to settle since statements made at trial
and possibly the judgment "could be used by a subsequent private plaintiff under
the admissions exception to the hearsay rule." Travers, supra note 9, at 57, citing
generally 4 J. WIGMoRE, EvmENCE § 1048059 (3rd. ed. 1940). However, such
a rule also operates to prevent any utility of the state action in obtaining redress
for a consumer defrauded by a planned deception unless the assurance can re-
quire it or the state litigates the whole matter. On the other hand, a rule that
such an agreement must be prima facie evidence of a violation would frustrate
mediation of the borderline case and force it to be litigated or dropped. The
better rule is to allow this question to be negotiated as with other issues when
the affidavit is being drafted. Rice, supra note 15, at 591-92. The provision in Sec-
tion II of the Kentucky proposal permitting the affidavit to cover "other such
action deemed necessary to correct the results of such practices" does this.
228 Spanogle, supra note 15, at 632-34.
229 Id. See note 228 supra.
23 0 Spanogle, supra note 15, at 632-34. The Massachusetts statute makes the con-
ditioning of taking an agreement upon making redress to consumers permissible.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, § 5 (Supp. 1968). The new Colorado enactment has
this provision along with the apparently unique addition that the state can excise
payment of its costs in the mediated assurance. Colo. H.B. 1030 § 7(2) (1969).
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has been damaged or has sustained loss as a result of any violation
of this Act.
(b) Such an action may be brought in any county of this Com-
monwealth where the alleged unlawful practice has been partially
or completely performed or in that county in which the defendant
has his principal place of business in this Commonwealth.
Section 15.
If a circuit court after appropriate notice and hearing shall
make a finding that a person has violated the provisions of any in-
junction or order issued pursuant to this Act, the circuit court
may assess such civil contempt penalty as it deems appropriate.
Undoubtedly, this proposal is correct in requiring that before
instituting court action, the enforcing agent must seek the voluntary
compliance of one allegedly employing a deceptive practice. Simi-
larly, the focusing of the Act on merely enjoining the offending
businessman rather than convicting him of a crime as present law
requires is a marked improvement for the protection of both con-
sumers and business. Furthermore, coupling the injunctive relief
with the elimination of the common law elements of intent, reli-
ance and damage is highly laudable. This will allow the state not only
to reach more fraudulent practices, but also to stop them without a
protracted trial during which the harm can continue.
Nevertheless, the greatest weakness of this proposal lies in the
paucity of sanctions provided in the above captioned sections. Ad-
mittedly, the elimination of common law and criminal elements re-
quires that the penalty for an unknowing violation should be only
an injunction. However, the present construction of the Act provides
that even if a party has willfully violated the Act or has violated his
affidavit of discontinuance, the only available remedy is injunctive.
It is only when an injunction has been violated that a civil penalty
may be levied, and then only through the mechanism of a second
proceeding on contempt charges. Manifestly, the "thrust of this
remedy is to inhibit retailers whose business location is permanent
and . . ." who are therefore those most likely to voluntarily comply
anyway. ". . .[It] scarcely deters the fly-by-night operator. 231
If he is later ordered to stop, or even ordered to redress vio-
lations, 232 he has lost nothing more than his illgotten gains. Where
23147 TEx. L. REV., supra note 179, at 469.
232He could be ordered to redress for violations under Section 14 of the
Kentucky proposal.
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he has nothing to lose by violating the statute, he is less likely to
be careful in observing the consumers rights. Any system which
depends upon stopping a course of prohibited conduct after it
occurs is not effective at halting the first violations.
233
An effective deterrent which should be included in the Act is a
substantial civil penalty.234 It is particularly appropriate for this type
legislation since it is less stringent in standards of proof than criminal
penalties, 235 notably in avoiding the element of intent.238 Another
possible penalty is business ouster, the dissolution of a domestic cor-
poration, and the disfranchisement of a foreign corporation.237 There
is presently a Kentucky statute which empowers the Attorney Gen-
eral to seek ouster in the event a corporation abuses or misuses its
corporate power, or otherwise "becomes detrimental to the interest
and welfare of the state or its citizens" 238 The court could also im-
pose ouster as "additional appropriate relief' pursuant to Section 14
of the proposed Act.239 However, it does not follow that the court
would undoubtedly agree that frequent or flagrant violation of the
consumer protection act should invoke this penalty. Certainly the
obvious severity of ouster requires that it be constrained to the role
of "a remedy of last resort."240 However, to insure that, if necessary
to the effective protection of the public, this penalty will be avail-
able for the enforcement of the proposed Act, it should be specified
in the Act. Therefore, to provide the deterrent effect necessary for
adequate consumer protection while being careful to levy severe
penalties only for acts of corresponding severity, a civil penalty should
lie for a willful violation of the Act or any violation of an affidavit or
injunction, while business ouster should be available only for sub-
stantial and willful violations of the Act, an affidavit or court order,
or for persistently fraudulent business conduct.241
233 Spanogle, supra note 15, at 633. See generally Rice, supra note 15, at
584-610.234 See Aniz. BEv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1532 (Supp. May 1967); N. J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-13 (Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 6-13.1-8 (Supp. I, 1968).235 Rice, supra note 15, at 594.
236 Id.
237 See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2524 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 121-1/2, §§ 267-68 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); N. Y. Bus. CoRP. L(fi §§ 1101,
1303 (McKinney 1967).
238 KRS § 271.590 (1946).239 See discussion of Section 14, Kentucky Business and Consumer Protection
Act, infra.240 Rice, supra note 15, at 594.
241 Borrowing from the New York statute [N.Y. Bus. Corn'. LAw §§ 1101,
1303 (McKinney 1967)], and the FTC proposed model, [CouNCm OF STATE
G*vEluNmN's, supra note 225, at 151-521, the suggestions hereinabove discussed
could be incorporated so that there would be added to Section 15 of the Ken-
tucky proposal the following sections:
(Continued on next page)
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Section 14. Additional Appropriate Relief
In addition to the aforementioned injunctive relief, in actions
filed pursuant to this Act, the circuit court may grant such other
relief as it deems necessary, including the award of court costs as
well as damages to any persons who may have been injured by
means of any practice declared to be unlawful by this Act.
The above noted section is satisfactory in that it permits the court,
as part of the judgment in a state initiated action, to award damages
to anyone who has been injured by any violations of the Act being
litigated therein. Its significance lies in the fact that the costs of in-
dividual suits are often greater than the judgments being sought.
242
In addition to the role of consumer counsel, this could be con-
strued to allow the Attorney General to be appointed by the court
as a receiver, in cases of flagrant violations of the Act, empowering
him to sue for, collect, receive and take into his possession all the
property derived by any practice declared illegal by the Act, and to
sell, convey, and assign the same and hold and dispose of the pro-
ceeds thereof under the direction of the court for any person who
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
15(b) Any person who violates the terms of an injunction or affidavit
of discontinuance issued under Section 11 or 12 of this chapter shall
forfeit and pay to the Commonwealth a civil penalty of not more than
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) per violation. For the pur-
poses of this section, the Circuit Court issuing an injunction shall re-
tain jurisdiction, and the cause shall be continued, and in such cases the
Attorney General acting in the name of the Commonwealth may petition
for recovery of civil penalties. [Compare CouNcm oF STATE GovamN-
mNTrs, supra, at 152.]
15(c) In any action brought under Section 12 of this chapter, if the
court finds that a person is willfully using or has willfully used a
method, act or practice declared unlawful by Section 4(a) of this chap-
ter, the Attorney General, upon petition to the Circuit Court, may re-
cover on behalf of the Commonwealth, a civil penalty of not exceed-
ing two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per violation. [Compare id.]
15(d) If any person persistently engages in a course of conduct declared
by Section 4(a) of this chapter to be unlawful, or is willuly using or has
willfully used an act or practice which is in substantial violation of Sec-
tion 4(a) of this chapter, the Attorney General may apply to the Cir-
cuit Court and, after hearing thereon, request an order vacating, an-
nulling or suspending the corporate charter of a corporation created
by or under the laws of this Commonwealth or revoking or suspending
the certificate of authority to do business in this Commonwealth of a
foreign corporation or revoking or suspending any other licenses, permits
or certificates issued pursuant to law to such person which are being
or have been used to further the unlawful act or practice. [See id. at
151-52; N.Y. Bus. CornP. LAw §§ 1101, 1303 (McKinney 1967).]
15(e) For the purposes of this section, a willful violation of Section
4(e) of this chapter occurs when the party committing the violation
knew or should have known that this conduct was a violation of Section
4(a). [Compare CouNci. oF STATE Govmam-Nr, supra, at 152.]
242 See note 127 supra, and the accompanying text.
[Vol. 58
had been damaged as a result of the illegal practice and for general
creditors.243 However, it is doubtful that the Act would be so con-
strued unless it expressly granted such power to the Attorney Gen-
eral, which it should do. This section also permits the court to award
court costs to the Attorney General which will aid the consumer by
preventing the Attorney General from having to finance the court
costs out of his own budget, thereby enabling him to enforce the
Act more frequently and effectively.
Despite the considerable merit of this section as it stands, it seems
that the Act would be improved by allowing its enforcement by private
individuals and by awarding court costs and attorneys' fees to such
individuals. First, while it can be reasonably assumed that the At-
torney General will be less likely to become a "captured regulator"
than an administrative agency,244 such an eventuality is not impossible.
Even where the industry does not dominate the agency, there are
necessary benefits from effective private enforcement. First, it
allows the consumer to act on his own initiative, either to deter
or seek cessation of violations and redress. He does not have to
obtain the prior approval or cooperation of the agency, rely upon
the quality of its staff, or overcome its inertia, red tape and con-
servatism. Secondly, it manifoldly increases the potential enforce-
ment powers. Few agencies have sufficient funds or manpower to
maintain adequate surveillance or to bring action against most
violations discovered. Effective private enforcement would create
thousands of additional investigators and the local bar would pro-
vide many additional prosecutors. Thirdly, it is more certain to
provide appropriate redress to the individual .... 245
Therefore, with the provisions of state action for receivership and




Whenever it appears that the public interest will be served by
doing so, the Attorney General may authorize a Commonwealth
Attorney or a County Attorney to institute an investigation or an
action pursuant to the provisions of this Act.
243 The Attorney General has been given the power of receivership by the
following state statutes: ILL. AwN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 268 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1969); IowA CODE § 713.24(8) (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-609 (Supp. 1968);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-9, as amended, (Supp. 1969).
244 See notes 54-62 supra and accompanying text.
245 Spanogle, supra note 15, at 627-28.
246 Section 14 of the Kentucky proposal would be improved by substituting
for it §§ 6-8 of the model Consumer Protection Act. CotnciL oF STATE Gov-




To carry out the purposes of this Act, there is appropriated to
the Department of Law out of the General Fund in the State
Treasury the sum of $100,000 for the 1970 fiscal year and $100,000
for the 1971 fiscal year.
To adequately resolve what will probably be the major problem
immediately following enactment of the principal proposal, budget
and staff, it includes a farsighted provision for assistance by local
prosecutors as well as reasonable budget. The involvement of local
prosecutorial personnel is not a totally innovative feature, but this
Act's well reasoned provision avoids the weaknesses of some cor-
responding state legislation. It does not disrupt the statewide coordin-
ation of enforcement which the honest businessman deserves by
giving coordinate authority to local officials. 247 Neither does it fail
to make full use of such assistance by limiting their role to reporting
violations. 248 Rather, it provides for coordinated enforcement of all
levels of government by utilizing both the observations and legal
talents of Commonwealth and County Attorneys.2 49
Even with these many assistants at the local level, administration
of this law will require expansion of the Attorney General's Con-
sumer Protection Division. Not only will the prosecutors have very
little time to devote to this area in view of their criminal prosecutorial
duties, but also the present staff of one lawyer and his secretary is
hardly adequate even without a law. The budgetary request of
$100,000 annually is comparable to the sums allocated to the bureaus
in neighboring states250 and should be adequate to finance the effective
protection of the consumer. While it may sound like a somewhat
high figure at first blush, two factors should be considered. First, the
expansion of the Attorney General's division is even less costly than
the creation of a new agency. Secondly, since the taxpaying and con-
suming public is identical, this is one instance in which the man who
pays the governmental piper not only calls the tune but also reaps the
247 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-614 (Supp. 1968); PENN. STAT. tit 73, § 201-4
(Purdon Supp. V, 1968). See Travers, supra note 9, at 55-56; 54 IowA L. REV.,
supra note 4, at 343 n.158.2 48 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, § 4 (Supp. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2462 (Supp. 1969).2 49 HAw.ix REv. STAT. § 480-2(a), (b) (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-12
(Supp. 1969).25o The budgets two and three years ago of neighboring or otherwise com-
parable states included: Illinois, $250,000; Maryland, $70,000; Missouri, $100,500;
Pennsylvania, $480,000; Washington, $137,688. Douglas, supra note 58, at 11-13,
16-18. In view of the age of these figures, they probably represent, at best, ap-
proximately two-thirds of the current budgets, respectively.
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benefits. For the entire activity of such an agency enforcing this type
law is to save the money the Kentucky consumer is currently losing
to deceptive business practices so it can be channelled to reputable
Kentucky businessmen.
CONCLUSION
The Business and Consumer Protection Act is a well reasoned
legislative proposal addressed to one of the most significant problems
of our time. In attempting to aid in the restoration of fair play in the
marketplace by bolstering the consumer's ability to fulfill his theo-
retical role, the bill seeks to thwart the frauds which fleece the Ken-
tucky consumer, and thereby the honest Kentucky businessman, of
millions each year. In view of both the dismal lack of statutory or
common law remedies available in Kentucky today and the legal and
practical limits on federal assistance, no other proposal could rank
higher on the General Assembly's agenda. While the protective shield
the bill hopes to provide the consumer could be strengthened at vari-
ous points, we are fully cognizant of the necessity of compromise to
attain this much progress. In this instance, even the idealist can hardly
fault the philosophy that "half a loaf is better than none:' Particularly
since the present plight of the Kentucky consumer can be character-
ized in comparable rhetoric by Marie Antoinnette's infamous epigram.
James T. Hodge
Sheryl Glenn Snyder
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